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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Many emerging markets share a long tradition of currency crises.1 Episodes like the Latin 
American crisis in the 1980s, Mexico 1994/1995, Asia 1997, Russia 1998, Brazil 1999 
and Argentina 2001/2002 have been extensively studied by the academic literature and 
inspired the evolution of three generations of currency crisis models. Although the period 
between 2000 and 2007 was characterized by relatively low pressure on emerging market 
currencies (Aizenman et al., 2012), many were hit hard during the global financial crisis 
(Dooley and Hutchison, 2009; Aizenman and Hutchison, 2012). Recently, many 
emerging currency markets again experienced severe turmoil.2  
However, currency risk is not an exclusive feature of emerging markets. In 1992, 
speculative pressure on the British pound forced the United Kingdom to withdraw from 
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. More recently, investors have raised doubts 
about the integrity of the eurozone, anticipating the potential exit(s) of one or several of 
its members. Such a scenario would most likely present a severe shock to financial 
markets and might even spark the break-up of the entire eurozone. In his famous speech 
on July 26th 2012, ECB president Mario Draghi acknowledged that high yields on EMU 
sovereign bonds partly also reflect the “risk of convertibility” (Draghi, 2012), i.e. the risk 
of redenomination either due to a single country’s withdrawal from the EMU or the entire 
eurozone’s break-up. Although the integrity of the eurozone has been preserved so far, 
                                                          
1 For example, between 1900 and 2010, Argentina experienced 43 currency crises, i.e. years characterized 
by a depreciation of the Argentine Peso against the U.S. dollar by more than 15%. Turkey experienced 30 
currency crises since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). 
2 Over the course of 2018, the Argentine Peso and the Turkish Lira lost 50.0%, respectively 28.7% of their 
value against the U.S. dollar. 
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doubts about some countries’ commitment to EMU membership continue to exist. Borri 
(2019) documents a recent surge in Italian redenomination risk, potentially arising from 
the ongoing dispute between the Italian government and the European Commission about 
the government’s fiscal deficit. In the 2019 European parliament election, the Eurosceptic 
Lega gained the highest share in the Italian popular vote. Similarly, in France, the 
Eurosceptic Rassemblement national received most of the votes. In April 2017, its leading 
candidate Marine Le Pen had suggested potential benefits of a French eurozone exit: “The 
French are overwhelmingly convinced that the euro is a burden. Returning to an adapted 
national currency will create millions of jobs and give us back our freedom.”(Le Pen, 
2017) 
The exposure to financial losses and economic costs potentially resulting from 
(sharp) devaluations of the domestic currency incentivizes financial investors and policy 
makers to monitor currency risk closely and in real-time. For investors seeking 
diversification through international investments, currency risk is a common risk factor 
(e.g. De Santis and Gérard, 1998). Currency crises in particular are typically accompanied 
by severe economic costs. For example, Hutchison and Noy (2005) estimate that real 
output declines by 5% - 8% over the two to four years following the outbreak of a 
currency crisis. Effects are more pronounced for emerging markets compared to 
developed countries (Hutchison and Noy, 2002). At the level of individual companies, 
Forbes (2002) documents that large devaluations of the domestic currency significantly 
affect company performance, although effects are quite heterogeneous between different 
crisis episodes and depend heavily on company-characteristics. A complete assessment 
of the costs associated with currency crises might even extent beyond purely economic 
costs. For example, Funke et al. (2016) show that political uncertainty and populism 
increase in the aftermath of financial crises. Hernández and Kriesi (2015) document that 
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populist radical right, radical left and non-mainstream parties in Western Europe 
benefited most from the economic hardship associated with the global financial crisis and 
the euro crisis. Algan et al. (2017) demonstrate that the euro crisis not only resulted in a 
higher voting share of populist parties, but also in an erosion of trust in national and 
European political institutions.  
 The potentially severe economic and political costs arising from currency crises 
and large depreciations of the domestic currency highlight the strong need for tools that 
allow policy makers and investors to monitor currency risk in real-time. Only if such 
high-frequency measures of currency risk are available, policy makers and investors will 
be able to respond to currency risk and the risk of currency crises in a timely manner.   
1.2 Outline of this thesis and contribution to the literature 
This thesis uses financial market data to derive real-time measures of currency risk and 
studies how it is determined by domestic and external factors. Existing studies of currency 
risk traditionally focus on the evolution of macro fundamental variables in proximity to 
currency crises (e.g. Eichengreen et al., 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Bussière and Fratzscher, 2006). However, these approaches do not allow 
for real-time identification of currency risk since the relevant macro data only becomes 
available with some publication lag. Therefore, these studies offer interesting insights in 
the causes of currency crises, but they do not allow policy makers or investors to respond 
to currency risk immediately. 
Consequently, an alternative strand of literature emerged that aims to identify 
currency risk based on financial market data, which allows for a forward-looking real-
time identification of currency risk. Analyzing prices of currency forwards or currency 
options might be one obvious alternative to identify currency risk. However, existing 
literature documents a forward discount anomaly, i.e. currency forwards tend to predict 
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exchange rate movements in the opposite direction (e.g. Engel, 1996). Frankel and 
Poonawala (2010) show that this bias exists for emerging market currencies as well, 
although it is significantly smaller compared to major currencies. Other papers study the 
pricing of currency options (e.g. Campa and Chang, 1998; Campa et al., 1998; Carr and 
Wu, 2007). These studies mostly focus on major currencies. While some papers also study 
emerging market currency options (e.g. Campa et al., 2002), for many emerging market 
currencies, especially smaller ones and those with peg arrangements, no currency options 
are available. Even for the countries with available currency options, option prices might 
not provide unbiased measures of currency risk. In many emerging markets, the domestic 
central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to manipulate the value of the 
currency (e.g. Menkhoff, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2019). In fact, many central banks do 
not only intervene in the spot, but also in the forward and option segments of the foreign 
exchange market (e.g. Mandeng, 2003; Keefe and Rengifo, 2015; Nedeljkovic and 
Saborowski, 2019). 
A third strand of literature studies the pricing of American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs) to identify currency risk. ADRs are U.S. dollar-denominated negotiable 
certificates that represent ownership of a fixed number of underlying shares, which are 
denominated in their respective local currency. The law of one price implies that, since 
ADRs and their underlying shares can be converted into each other, their prices should 
equal when expressed in the same currency and adjusted for their fixed conversion ratio 
(Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). Various studies analyze deviations from the law of one price 
during financial crises (e.g. Bailey et al., 2000; Melvin, 2003; Bin et al., 2004; Auguste 
et al., 2006; Pasquariello, 2008).  
 This thesis builds on the idea that ADR prices reflect investors’ exchange rate 
expectations. Arquette et al. (2008) document that the price spread between Chinese 
 
5 
securities and their cross-listed ADRs and H-shares is driven by exchange rate 
expectations drawn from forward rates. Eichler (2011) shows that price discounts on 
Chinese cross-listed stocks can predict the yuan-U.S. dollar exchange rate more 
accurately than the random walk and forward exchange rates. Several papers study the 
capital control episode in Argentina 2001/02 and find that ADRs traded at a price discount 
relative to their corresponding underlying stocks prior to the devaluation of the peso (e.g. 
Melvin, 2003; Kadiyala and Kadiyala, 2004; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004; Auguste et al., 
2006; Eichler et al., 2009). Melvin (2003), Levy Yeyati et al. (2004) and Auguste et al. 
(2006) relate these ADR discounts to capital control circumvention premia. Local 
residents were willing to pay a premium on domestic stocks that could be converted into 
ADRs and then cashed into U.S. dollars. Kadiyala and Kadiyala (2004), on the other hand, 
relate this relative discount to investors’ expectations of the true exchange rate. Moreover, 
Eichler et al. (2009) study the determinants of currency crisis expectations, finding that 
falling commodity prices and currency overvaluation, as well as rising sovereign default 
risk, drive ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations. Furthermore, Maltritz and Eichler 
(2010) employ an options-based approach to disentangle the probabilities of currency 
crises from expected devaluations.  
This thesis contributes to the strand of literature mentioned above by analyzing 
the pricing of ADRs in various contexts to derive real-time measures of currency risk. 
Chapter 2 is co-authored by Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler and was published in the Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money in 2018. It studies currency risk 
in a sample of 21 emerging market economies between 1994 and 2014. First, a country-
specific index of domestic macroeconomic stress that captures three potential dimensions 
of currency risk (export commodity prices, sovereign risk and fragility in the domestic 
banking system) is constructed. Then, this macroeconomic stress index is introduced into 
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the ADR pricing framework. Investors will price macroeconomic stress in ADR returns 
if they perceive significant currency risk. Currencies depreciate significantly more in the 
same and the following year after significant currency risk is identified. Also, currency 
crises are significantly more frequent in these years. Next, inflation and the fiscal balance 
are identified as the main determinants of currency risk. Interaction models show that 
their impact is particularly strong if the domestic sovereign’s rating is poor, foreign 
reserves and capital account openness are low and the currency is managed. 
This chapter contributes to the literature that studies the pricing of ADRs to derive 
real-time measures of currency risk. In particular, it modifies the methodology of existing 
studies in a way that allows for the identification of currency risk within a significantly 
broader sample of countries and years. Instead of analyzing price spreads that can only 
persist if arbitrage is limited, e.g. during periods of capital controls, this chapter studies 
whether domestic macroeconomic stress (capturing three potential sources of currency 
risk) significantly affects ADR returns. Consequently, the analysis in this chapter is not 
restricted to periods with limitations on capital flows. In addition, this chapter links the 
literature that extracts financial market data to identify currency risk to the traditional 
strand of currency crisis literature that studies macro fundamental variables as 
determinants of currency risk. Therefore, it combines the advantages of both approaches. 
In the first stage, currency risk is extracted from ADR returns. This methodology provides 
a valuable tool to policy makers and investors since it allows a real-time response to 
currency risk. The second stage investigates the macro fundamental variables that 
determine currency risk, providing additional interesting insights to investors and policy 
makers.   
Chapter 3 is also co-authored by Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler. This chapter introduces 
a country-specific measure of eurozone exit risk for each of the five GIIPS countries 
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(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) over the period from January 2008 to June 
2015. Since currency union membership is a special case of currency peg, the risk that a 
country withdraws from the eurozone also reflects currency risk. ADR investors are 
exposed to potential losses associated with a eurozone exit, most importantly due to the 
redenomination of the underlying stocks into the new devaluated currency, the 
introduction of capital controls, or the closing of the domestic stock exchange. 
The identification of eurozone exit risk in this study is methodologically similar 
to the one presented in the second chapter. Again, a country-specific indicator is 
introduced into the ADR pricing framework. In the spirit of second-generation currency 
crisis models, this indicator comprises three dimensions that proxy the domestic 
government’s incentives to leave the eurozone. These include sovereign risk, financial 
fragility (stemming from distress in the domestic banking sector) and real fragility 
(stemming from low current growth and a poor growth outlook). Next, this chapter studies 
the economic impact of eurozone exit risk on European banks outside the GIIPS countries 
and on domestic non-financial companies in the GIIPS countries. European banks 
respond negatively to the exit risk of Greece, Ireland and Portugal. Bank-specific bilateral 
credit risk exposure to the respective GIIPS country is one driving channel for banks’ 
eurozone exit risk exposure. Increases in Greek and Irish exit risk affect banks with higher 
bilateral credit risk exposure to the respective country more negatively. In addition, 
eurozone exit risk has a significantly negative impact on domestic non-financial 
companies in the GIIPS countries. The exit risk exposure of these domestic non-financial 
firms is lower for companies characterized by a low ratio of short-term debt to cash and 
a larger firm size. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis expands a small number of existing studies that propose 
measures of euro redenomination risk, respectively eurozone exit risk (most importantly, 
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De Santis, 2018; Krishnamurthy et al., 2018). Using ADRs to identify eurozone exit risk 
allows this study to contribute to the literature by providing a measure of eurozone exit 
risk that is available for all five GIIPS countries over a significantly longer time period 
(from January 2008 to June 2015). This is a prerequisite for the principal contribution of 
this chapter: the analysis of the economic impact of eurozone exit risk on European banks 
and domestic companies in the GIIPS countries. It thereby contributes to a larger strand 
of literature that studies the general economic impact of the euro crisis, like for example 
the sovereign-bank nexus (e.g. Acharya et al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; 
Fratzscher and Rieth, 2018) or its consequences on the real economy (e.g. Martin and 
Philippon, 2017; Meinen and Roehe, 2017). In addition, chapter 3 adds to a strand of 
literature that uses theoretical models to study specific aspects of eurozone exit risk (e.g. 
Kriwoluzky et al., 2015; Eijffinger et al., 2018). Finally, this chapter expands the work of 
Forbes (2002) who studies how large devaluations affect company performance and how 
this impact depends on company-characteristics.  
Chapter 4 studies the impact of US monetary policy on managed exchange rates 
and currency peg regimes. For currencies that are managed, the domestic central bank 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market to manipulate the domestic currency’s value. 
Analyzing the pricing of ADRs around FOMC meetings offers a unique opportunity to 
identify changes in investors’ expectations about the future value of the underlying 
currency arising from US monetary policy. The impact of US monetary surprises (i.e. 
unanticipated changes in the FED Funds Rate) differs significantly dependent on the 
exchange rate regime. For managed exchange rate regimes, US monetary surprises lead 
to lower abnormal ADR returns, reflecting decreases in the fundamental values of these 
currencies caused by US monetary policy shocks. Countries that peg their currency to the 
U.S. dollar must mimic US policy rate increases if they want to maintain the currency 
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peg. However, standard currency crises models of interest rate defense predict that raising 
the domestic policy rate is costly. Lahiri and Végh (2007) state that increasing the 
domestic policy rate is associated with output costs, fiscal costs and a deterioration of the 
domestic banking system. Consequently, domestic policy makers might be reluctant to 
mimic US policy rate increases if such a move is associated with high economic costs. 
Accordingly, positive US monetary surprises lead to lower abnormal ADR returns 
(reflecting a higher currency peg breakdown probability) if the costs of mimicking the 
policy rate increase are high. High costs are proxied by low current real GDP growth 
relative to past growth, a high fiscal deficit and a weak state of the domestic banking 
sector.  
Chapter 4 contributes to three strands of literature. First, it supplements existing 
studies that document a significant impact of US monetary policy on financial markets 
(e.g. Thorbecke, 1997; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Lucca and Moench, 2015). Second, 
it adds to the strand of literature investigating the transmission of global shocks and US 
monetary policy in particular (e.g. Kim, 2001; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman 
and Wongswan, 2011; Dedola et al., 2017). Finally, it contributes to the currency crisis 
literature, especially second-generation currency crisis models and models of an interest 
rate defense of currency pegs (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994; Bensaid and Jeanne, 1997; Lahiri and 
Végh; 2007) by providing empirical support for their main prediction. This chapter also 
links various strands of the currency risk literature by investigating how currency risk 
might emerge from the interaction of exogenous shocks (in this case US monetary policy) 
with domestic factors (the current state of the domestic economy).  
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1.3 Supplementary information – individual contributions 
In accordance with §10 (3) 5 PromO2018, the following section identifies the individual 
contribution of Ingmar Rövekamp (the author of this thesis) to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
which both have been co-authored by Prof Dr. Stefan Eichler.  
Ingmar Rövekamp and Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler jointly developed the research 
question and the general research design of Chapter 2. Ingmar Rövekamp further worked 
out the contribution of this chapter based on his literature research. In addition, he was 
solely responsible for conducting the empirical analysis. For the first part of this chapter, 
which deals with the identification of currency risk, he decided to use panel regressions 
with fixed effects and introduced interaction terms that allow to identify ADR-underlying 
pair specific effects. He also proposed most of the additional variables included in these 
regressions (e.g. financial disintegration as suggested by Pasquariello, 2008, the return of 
the US market and the Fama & French factors) to control for other potential sources of 
deviations from the law of one price. In addition, he promoted the use of weekly data 
following Bae et al. (2008) to reduce the bias potentially resulting from non-synchronous 
trading hours. Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler contributed to the empirical analysis of this first 
part of the chapter with his suggestion to conduct a principal component analysis to 
summarize three different dimensions of macroeconomic stress (commodity prices, 
sovereign risk and fragility in the banking sector) into one variable. He also proposed 
analyzing the relative importance of the explanatory variables in the ADR pricing 
equation by comparing their standardized coefficients and semi-partial R². Ingmar 
Rövekamp contributed to the calculation of the country-specific macroeconomic stress 
index by identifying the specific variables that describe the economic concepts proposed 
by Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler. Furthermore, Ingmar Rövekamp suggested testing the 
predictive power of the ADR-based currency risk measure by comparing exchange rate 
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returns, the relative frequency of devaluations and currency crises in the current and the 
upcoming year between years with and without significant currency risk. He also 
proposed using a binary variable that indicates the presence of significant currency risk 
and employing a logit regression framework to study the fundamental determinants of 
currency risk. In addition, he also proposed most of the explanatory variables used in this 
second part of the empirical analysis. It was also his idea to conduct a robustness check 
using lagged values of the explanatory variables. Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler contributed to 
this second part of the empirical analysis in this chapter with the idea to test political 
variables and to estimate the interaction models in the final part of this chapter. Ingmar 
Rövekamp suggested using the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) exchange rate regime classification 
to distinguish peg regimes versus managed regimes.  
 For Chapter 3, Ingmar Rövekamp and Prof. Dr. Stefan Eichler again jointly 
developed the research question and the general research design. Ingmar Rövekamp 
worked out the contribution by identifying the various strands of literature to which this 
chapter adds. In particular, he identified the advantages of the eurozone exit risk indicator 
that is introduced in this chapter over existing approaches of redenomination risk in the 
eurozone by comparing them conceptually. Ingmar Rövekamp was also solely 
responsible for conducting the empirical analysis of Chapter 3. For the first part of this 
chapter that deals with the identification of eurozone exit risk of the GIIPS countries, i t 
was his idea to employ a rolling panel regression framework with fixed effects. He also 
promoted the inclusion of various control variables to account for other potential sources 
of deviations from the law of one price (e.g. financial disintegration following 
Pasquariello, 2008, or limits to arbitrage, following Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010). Prof. Dr. 
Stefan Eichler contributed to this part of the analysis by proposing to use the semi-partial 
R2 as statistical concept to identify eurozone exit risk. Similar to his contribution to 
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Chapter 2, he furthermore suggested using principal component analysis to construct a 
country-specific indicator that captures three different dimensions of a country’s 
incentives to leave the eurozone. Ingmar Rövekamp proposed to study the economic 
impact of eurozone exit risk on European banks. In addition, it was his idea to test bilateral 
credit risk exposure as a channel for the exit risk exposure of European banks. He decided 
to use bank level data provided by the European Banking Authority (EBA). Prof. Dr. 
Stefan Eichler contributed to the analysis of the economic impact of eurozone exit risk 
with his idea to study the impact on domestic non-financial companies. For both sections, 
Ingmar Rövekamp designed the respective panel regression models that allowed 
analyzing the impact of eurozone exit risk on European banks and non-financial 
companies in the GIIPS countries and he selected the necessary control variables. 
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Chapter 3  
Eurozone exit risk 
Abstract: We introduce a novel indicator of eurozone exit risk based on American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs). We exploit ADR investors’ exposure to potential losses 
associated with a eurozone exit, e.g. due to redenomination of underlying stocks into the 
new devaluated currency, capital controls or trading halts. We are the first to analyze the 
effects of eurozone exit risk on banks and non-financial firms. European banks are 
negatively affected by exit risk of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, channeled through 
bilateral credit risk. Non-financial firms in the GIIPS countries respond negatively to 
domestic exit risk, while a lower ratio of short-term debt to cash and larger company size 
reduce this exposure. 
3.1 Introduction 
We introduce a novel indicator of eurozone exit risk based on American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs). Our measure exploits ADR investors’ exposure to potential losses 
associated with a eurozone exit, most importantly due to the redenomination of the 
underlying stocks into the new devaluated currency, the introduction of capital controls, 
or the closing of the domestic stock exchange. Existing indicators of euro redenomination 
risk are composite measures of the risk of a breakup of the entire eurozone and the risk 
of an exit from the eurozone (for example, Krishnamurthy et al., 2018; De Santis, 2018). 
Our indicator identifies the exit risk for the individual country. In contrast to indicators 
of redenomination risk, our exit risk indicator is available for all five GIIPS countries 
over a significantly longer sample period from January 2008 to June 2015. We further 
contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the effects of eurozone exit risk on banks 
and non-financial firms. We study how eurozone exit risk affects European banks outside 
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the GIIPS countries and how this exposure is channeled through their bilateral credit risk 
exposure to the respective GIIPS country. We study how non-financial firms in the GIIPS 
countries are affected by domestic exit risk and analyze which company-specific factors 
determine their exit risk exposure.  
ADRs represent ownership of a specific number of underlying shares in the home 
market (in our case, the eurozone countries) on which the ADR is written. The ADR and 
the underlying stocks provide the same ownership rights. They only differ with respect to 
their currency denomination and trading location: ADRs trade in the United States and 
are denominated in U.S. dollars, while underlying shares trade on the European market 
and are denominated in the domestic currency – the euro. In the course of eurozone exit, 
domestic shares would be redenominated into the new domestic currency, which would 
most probably devalue sharply against the U.S. dollar. Since ADRs by definition continue 
to be denominated in U.S. dollars, this would cause redenomination losses to ADR 
investors.26 Assuming rational expectations, ADR investors estimate the expected value 
of their overall losses due to eurozone exit and account for this risk when pricing ADRs. 
We identify eurozone exit risk empirically by the fraction of ADR returns explained by a 
country-specific index of observable financial and economic vulnerabilities that represent 
the government’s incentive to exit the eurozone and that can be monitored by ADR 
investors in real-time.  
ADRs are an ideal laboratory to derive eurozone exit risk. After controlling for 
company-specific factors, the U.S. dollar/euro spot and forward exchange rate, financial 
and economic vulnerabilities in the other GIIPS countries, the U.S. market, financial 
disintegration, limits to arbitrage, liquidity and regulatory differences between ADR and 
                                                          
26 Other losses to ADR investors associated with a eurozone exit might result from the introduction of 
capital controls or trading halts in the exiting country. It is important to note that for our empirical approach 
it is not necessary to distinguish between different types of losses for ADR investors associated with a 
eurozone exit. 
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underlying stocks, the exposure of ADR investors to potential eurozone exit losses can 
explain the remaining return differential between ADRs and their underlying stocks. We 
do not attribute the entire ADR underlying return differential to eurozone exit risk, but 
only the part that remains unexplained by the various control variables and that correlates 
with the country-specific indicator representing incentives to leave the eurozone.   
There are a few papers on redenomination risk related to our study. In their study 
on the effects of the ECB’s unconventional measures, Krishnamurthy et al. (2018) exploit 
the contractual differences between CDS and bonds to measure the risk of currency 
redenomination of euro denominated bonds.27 De Santis (2018) uses the differences in 
euro and U.S. dollar denominated sovereign CDS premia as an indicator of 
redenomination risk. Klose and Weigert (2014) use data from the prediction market 
platform Intrade and study how euro area break-up risk affects sovereign bond yields of 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Bayer et al. (2018) construct term structures of 
redenomination risk for France, Germany and Italy by comparing yields on domestic law 
sovereign bonds (that would be redenominated) and corporate bonds issued under another 
country’s jurisdiction (that can be expected to be repaid in euros), after controlling for 
their respective default risk using CDS data. 
A redenomination of euro denominated bonds into a new national currency can 
occur after the breakup of the entire eurozone or the unilateral exit of a country from the 
eurozone. Existing redenomination indicators are composite measures of both types of 
risk. Our measure aims to isolate country-specific eurozone exit risk by exploiting the 
correlation of ADR returns with country-specific incentives to leave the eurozone, while 
                                                          
27 For Italy, for example, CDS do not cover losses caused by the redenomination from euros into a new 
national currency and thus purely reflect default risk of the underlying bond. Yields of euro denominated 
bonds, on the contrary, reflect default risk and redenomination risk. Sovereign bond yields above the CDS 
premium would thus indicate redenomination risk. For Portugal and Spain, CDS cover losses from both 
default and redenomination. Consequently, the authors use the difference between CDS premiums and the 
yields from U.S. dollar denominated bonds (which are purely driven by default risk). 
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controlling for the overall financial vulnerability of the entire crisis countries bloc. 
Moreover, existing studies (except for Krishnamurthy et al., 2018) cannot consider 
Greece for reasons of data availability, while we study all five GIIPS countries over the 
period from January 2008 to June 2015.28   
We find significantly higher eurozone exit risk for the five crisis countries 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) as compared to Germany, which we include 
as a placebo test. Moreover, exit risk of GIIPS countries shows remarkable time series 
variation, while it is neglectable and stable in Germany.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the economic effects of 
eurozone exit risk on banks and non-financial firms using stock market data. We identify 
a significant negative unconditional impact of Portuguese exit risk on stock returns of 28 
European banks outside the GIIPS countries. In addition, we find that higher bilateral 
credit risk exposure (taken from the 2011 EBA stress test) is associated with a larger 
exposure to the eurozone exit risk of Greece and Ireland. A higher exposure to the exiting 
country makes the bank more vulnerable to increases in eurozone exit risk by increasing 
expected losses due to redenomination, write-downs of loans, or bond portfolio losses in 
the case of eurozone exit. For example, for Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, the bank 
outside the GIIPS countries with the highest bilateral credit risk exposure to Ireland 
(10.58% of total assets), monthly stock returns decrease by about 0.71%, given a one 
                                                          
28 Krishnamurthy et al. (2018) suggest a measure of redenomination risk for Italy, Portugal and Spain 
between January 2010 and December 2012. For Greece, they offer an alternative measure based on the 
yield differential between domestic EUR-denominated and foreign law U.S. dollar-denominated sovereign 
bonds. However, this yield differential does not only cover redenomination risk, but also domestic 
sovereign segmentation effects and is negative for a substantial fraction of their sample. Also, their time-
series of Greek redenomination risk only covers the period up to August 2011. De Santis (2018) identifies 
redenomination risk for Italy, Spain and France for a sample period from September 13, 2011 to November 
12, 2013. Data provided by the betting platform Intrade used in Klose and Weigert (2014) becomes 
unavailable after December 2013. In addition, it only proxies the risk of one country leaving the eurozone, 
therefore it does not allow to identify country-specific estimates of euro exit risk. Bayer et al. (2018) focus 
on France, Germany and Italy and derive term structures of redenomination risk for the period from January 
2010 to September 2014. 
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standard deviation increase in Irish exit risk, while for ING Groep NV, a bank with no 
credit risk exposure to Ireland, there is no significant effect. These findings suggest that 
several European banks do not sufficiently hedge their exposure to the eurozone exit risk 
of the GIIPS countries, underlining an underexplored risk factor relevant for banking 
regulation.   
Moreover, we analyze the exposure of 355 non-financial stocks to domestic 
eurozone exit risk in the GIIPS countries. We find that domestic exit risk significantly 
negatively affects returns of these stocks, with effects being particularly strong for a 
subsample period from January 2008 to the end of July 2012 when Mario Draghi 
delivered his famous “whatever it takes” speech. Especially for this subsample period, 
the effect is also highly economically significant, as a one standard deviation increase in 
our eurozone exit risk measure is associated with a reduction in monthly stock returns by 
about 0.60%. Looking at the cross-sectional differences of euro exit risk exposures, we 
conclude that companies with a higher ratio of short-term debt to cash are more exposed 
to eurozone exit risk. Investors appear to anticipate higher risks of debt rollover, liquidity 
driven defaults, or hikes in borrowing costs associated with eurozone exit risk particularly 
for companies with higher debt to cash ratios. Also, larger companies are less exposed to 
domestic eurozone exit risk. This result suggests that larger companies are better able to 
stand shocks associated with eurozone exit due to their broader diversification and their 
larger flexibility to receive funding following the disintegration of the domestic financial 
system following eurozone exit (Forbes, 2002a). 
Our paper adds to several strands of the literature. A few papers study the 
empirical and theoretical implications of euro-area break-up risk and redenomination risk 
in the eurozone. Within a New Keynesian small open economy framework, Kriwoluzky 
et al. (2015) show that exit expectations lead to increases in sovereign and corporate 
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refinancing cost and thus have adverse effects on economic activity. Their model 
rationalizes our empirical findings that non-financial firms are, on average, negatively 
exposed to eurozone exit risk, while a higher ratio of short-term debt to cash increases 
this exposure by increasing the dependency on external financing. Eijffinger et al. (2018) 
model the endogenous decision to default on sovereign debt and to exit the eurozone. In 
their model, the decision of eurozone exit is driven by uncertain exit costs. Eurozone 
members learn about exit costs when a country actually leaves the eurozone. Their results 
reveal that a low perceived eurozone exit cost for one country, e.g. Greece, is associated 
with a large increase in sovereign yield spreads of other vulnerable countries, constituting 
a contagion mechanism in the eurozone. Steiner et al. (2019) analyze the euro area crisis 
in a policy trilemma framework, where the three policy goals currency union, unlimited 
capital movements between eurozone member countries and stable/autonomous 
monetary policy cannot be achieved at one time. They find that the ECB‘s entry into 
LTROs and „whatever it takes“ occurred after peak in redenomination risk in November 
2011, implying that the ECB implemented unconventional measures (partly) to avert the 
breakup of the euro area. Borri (2019) analyzes the spillovers of redenomination risk 
applying a CoVAR methodology to quanto CDS. He finds significant spillovers of 
redenomination risk only for Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Spain, while spillovers are 
negligible in other countries. 
We further contribute to a strand of the literature investigating cross sectional 
heterogeneity in the effect of large currency depreciation on firm performance in 
emerging markets (Forbes, 2002a; Forbes, 2004; Desai et al., 2008). These studies 
generally find a positive effect of large depreciations on firm performance and find that 
foreign sales, company debt and firm size significantly affect this performance (Forbes, 
2002a).   
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Furthermore, there is a broad literature on other important aspects of the euro area 
crisis. Several papers look at the drivers of and contagion in sovereign default risk in the 
eurozone (e.g. Aizenman et al., 2013; Ang and Longstaff, 2013; Corsetti et al., 2013; 
Costantini et al., 2014; Benzoni et al., 2015). Other papers focus on the bank-sovereign 
risk nexus (e.g. Acharya et al., 2014; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Popov and van Horen, 
2015; Bocola, 2016; Brunnermeier et al., 2016; Engler and Große Steffen, 2016; Gaballo 
and Zetlin-Jones, 2016; Fratzscher and Rieth, 2018). A third strand of literature relates to 
the effects of policy measures implemented during the eurozone crisis, especially the 
(unconventional) monetary policy measures of the ECB (e.g. Drechsler et al., 2016; Eser 
and Schwaab, 2016; Koijen et al., 2017; Krishnamurthy et al., 2018; Acharya et al., 2019). 
Others focus on the real effects of the eurozone crisis (e.g. Martin and Philippon, 2017; 
Meinen and Roehe, 2017).  
Our paper also relates to studies investigating the pricing of ADRs during currency 
crises. Several studies document that the returns on U.S. dollar denominated ADRs are 
negatively affected by currency crises as the devaluation of the local currency depresses 
the U.S. dollar value of the underlying stock (Bailey et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2000; Bin et 
al., 2004). Pasquariello (2008) reveals that the outbreak of financial crises is associated 
with a disintegration of the local capital market as the pricing dynamics of ADRs and 
their underlying stocks change. Another strand of the literature shows how capital 
controls can lead to price wedges between ADRs and their underlyings, with underlyings 
being typically overpriced (Melvin, 2003; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004; Auguste et al., 2006; 
Arquette et al., 2008; Levy Yeyati et al., 2009). Several papers use ADRs to derive 
exchange rate forecasts (e.g. Eichler et al., 2009) and to show that financial fragility 
measures affect the relative pricing of ADRs and their underlyings during the eurozone 
crisis (Eichler, 2011).  
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the methodology and 
data and provides some descriptive evidence. Section 3.3 analyzes the exposure of 
European banks to eurozone exit risk. Section 3.4 looks at the exit risk exposure of non-
financial stocks in the GIIPS countries and investigates the channels establishing this risk 
exposure. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Methodology and data 
3.2.1 ADR pricing and eurozone exit risk 
An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) represents ownership of a specific number of 
underlying shares in the home market on which the ADR is written. While the underlying 
stock is traded on the stock exchange of the respective eurozone country and is 
denominated in euros, the ADR trades in the United States and is denominated in U.S. 
dollars.  
 Since the ADR provides the same rights to the owner as the underlying stock (e.g. 
dividend claims and voting rights), and the ADR and underlying stock can be converted 
into each other at a fixed conversion ratio, the exchange rate adjusted prices of both stocks 
should be equal (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010):    
𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑅 𝑖,𝑡  = 𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷 𝑖,𝑡∗𝛾𝑖𝑆𝑡   (3.1) 
 with 𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 representing the prices of the ADR and its corresponding 
underlying stock, respectively, 𝛾𝑖  a fixed conversion parameter and 𝑆𝑡 the EUR/USD spot 
exchange rate. For a fully credible eurozone membership of the country from where the 
underlying originates, ADR returns are thus governed by the returns of the underlying 
stock and the exchange rate: 
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𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡𝑆 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3.2) 
If ADR investors do anticipate some risk that a country may leave the eurozone, 
ADR returns should reflect such risk. We aim to identify eurozone exit risk by introducing 
a country-specific indicator VUL into the ADR pricing framework which captures 
fundamental vulnerabilities measuring the government’s incentives to leave the eurozone 
(such as sovereign default risk or fragility in the banking sector and in the real economy 
in the country under consideration). A more detailed description on how we derive this 
indicator follows in section 3.2.2. Our identification strategy bases on the assumption that 
if ADR investors perceive eurozone exit risk, they will monitor financial and economic 
vulnerabilities that drive the government’s incentive to leave the eurozone and 
incorporate this information in ADR returns. The fraction of ADR returns that remains 
unexplained by the return of the underlying, the return of the EUR/U.S. dollar exchange 
rate and the numerous control variables, will then correlate with such an indicator. On the 
contrary, if no eurozone exit risk is perceived, such a vulnerability indicator would not 
affect ADR returns since there is no reason why these financial and economic 
vulnerabilities should affect ADR pricing (given our large set of control variables that 
already account for issues that are either company specific or related to the external value 
of the euro, financial and economic vulnerabilities in the other GIIPS countries, liquidity, 
financial disintegration, limits to arbitrage and time-invariant regulatory issues). 
To derive an indicator of eurozone exit risk based on ADR data for a specific 
country, we estimate the following equation in a rolling panel regression framework 
containing all ADRs from the respective country from our sample, with an estimation 
window of 60 trading days: 
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𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  𝛼𝑖,𝑇 + 𝛽1,𝑗,𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷 + 𝛽2,𝑗,𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡     + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑗,𝑇𝑋𝑙,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=3 +𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   
(3.3) 
 where 𝑖 is the ADR-underlying stock pair index, 𝑗 represents the country in which 
the underlying stock is traded, and 𝑇 denotes the day for which the respective rolling 
regressions window is estimated. 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 denotes the country-specific indicator describing 
financial and economic vulnerabilities that drive the incentive to exit the eurozone. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=3  captures the set of control variables, 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 is the ADR-underlying stock pair 
fixed effect, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡the error term. Table A3.1 in the appendix of this chapter reports the 
variables and their sources used in equation (3.3). 
To estimate eurozone exit risk, we compute the semi-partial R² of 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 drawn 
from the rolling panel regressions in equation (3.3). The semi-partial R² indicates how 
much of the variation in the ADR returns from countries that might potentially leave the 
eurozone is unexplained by the control variables in equation (3.3) and can be explained 
by the information contained in 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 – additional to that information already contained 
in the return of the EUR/USD spot exchange rate, the return of the respective underlying 
of the ADR and the various control variables. We hypothesize that the more probable it 
is that a specific country exits the eurozone, the higher will be the impact of 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 on 
ADR returns, as identified by a higher semi-partial R².  
The exposure of ADR investors to potential losses associated with a eurozone exit 
(e.g. due to the currency redenomination and the potential price loss of the underlying 
stock in U.S. dollar terms) can help explain the remaining return differential between the 
ADR and its underlying stocks (after controlling for underlying stock, EUR/USD spot 
and future exchange rates, financial and economic vulnerabilities in the other GIIPS 
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countries, U.S. market returns, financial disintegration, limits to arbitrage, liquidity and 
differences in regulation between the ADR and its underlying stock).  
We include various control variables in equation (3.3) to account for potential 
deviations between actual ADR returns and returns predicted by the return of the 
underlying and the EUR/USD spot exchange rate that might not relate to eurozone exit 
risk. First, we control for investors’ expectations of the future external value of the euro 
by including the return of a CME composite continuous EUR/USD futures index. Second, 
we account for financial and economic vulnerabilities of the respective other four GIIPS 
countries. These vulnerabilities shape the incentive of other GIIPS countries to leave the 
eurozone and thus drive ADR investors’ perception of eurozone break-up risk. Our 
analysis allows us to disentangle country-specific euro exit risk from eurozone break-up 
risk and ensures that our results are not driven by the fact that the country-specific 
vulnerability indicators correlate between the GIIPS countries.  
In addition, we control for the return of the US market and include weekday 
dummies. Pasquariello (2008) shows that the law of one price between ADRs and their 
underlyings substantially weakens following financial disintegration of the domestic 
market from global financial markets in times of financial turmoil. We control for 
financial integration by including the international CAPM beta as an explanatory 
variable,29 thus ensuring that our results are not driven by financial disintegration of the 
domestic economy during the euro crisis. Also, we follow Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) 
and include the change in the bid-ask spreads of both the ADR and the underlying as well 
as the change in idiosyncratic risk of the ADR-underlying stock pair30 as additional 
                                                          
29 The financial integration indicator is obtained by regressing the excess return (over the 3M T-Bills rate) 
of the local stock index (in USD) of the respective eurozone country on the excess return of the MSCI 
World index (in USD) using a rolling regressions framework over the past 30 trading days.  
30 The ADR-underlying stock pair specific measure of idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the 
residuals from regressing the difference between USD returns of the ADR and its underlying on 
contemporaneous as well as one day lagged and leading values of the US stock market, the respective 
 
78 
explanatory variables to control for limits to arbitrage. Finally, we include ADR-
underlying pair fixed effects to control for time-invariant idiosyncratic stock 
characteristics as well as for differences between ADRs and their underlying stocks with 
respect to regulation (e.g. due to taxation). We cannot directly use the residuals from 
equation (3.3) without including 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 as our measure of euro exit risk because they 
would capture all other potential sources of deviations from the law of one price which 
are not related to a eurozone exit and which we cannot control for. By considering the 
semi-partial R² of 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 we only account for deviations from the law of one price that 
are not yet captured by the other control variables in our regression and that are 
theoretically linked to the eurozone exit of the country from where the underlying 
originates. Also, it is important to state that a positive semi-partial R² of 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 does not 
result in persistent deviations of the law of one price which by definition cannot exist in 
the absence of restrictions on capital flows. 
3.2.2 Construction of the country-specific financial and economic vulnerability 
indicator 
It is important to stress that our country-specific financial and economic vulnerability 
indicator does not measure eurozone exit risk per se, but rather the incentive of the 
domestic government to leave the eurozone. Following the second generation of currency 
crisis models, a country opts to abandon a currency peg/to exit a currency union if the 
expected benefits outweigh the expected costs (Obstfeld, 1994). Our financial and 
economic vulnerability indicator proxies the potential benefits of a eurozone exit/cost of 
staying within the eurozone. Since the political decision to leave the eurozone also 
                                                          
domestic stock market and the change in the EUR/USD exchange rate using a rolling window of 30 trading 
days, see eq. (1) in Gagnon and Karolyi (2010). 
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depends on country- and time-dependent political preferences and the costs of an exit,31 
we obtain eurozone exit risk by exploring the exposure of ADR returns to this country-
specific financial and economic vulnerability indicator (while the vulnerability indicator 
itself does not identify eurozone exit risk for the reasons mentioned above). 
Shambaugh (2012) characterizes the euro crisis as a combination of three 
interlocking crises: a banking crisis, a sovereign debt crisis and a growth crisis. With our 
indicator we intent to capture these three dimensions of financial and economic 
vulnerabilities that represent incentives to leave the eurozone. A more fragile banking 
sector may be recapitalized and restructured more effectively outside the eurozone. 
Therefore, lower returns of a country-specific bank index proxy a higher incentive to 
leave the eurozone. Higher sovereign default risk (as indicated by higher sovereign bond 
spreads) indicates that the domestic government is less able to avert sovereign default 
within the eurozone, and would rather opt to exit the eurozone in order to minimize the 
real value of its public debt. Eijffinger et al. (2018) provide a theoretical model for a 
government’s endogenous decision to leave the eurozone based on its incentive to 
partially default on its public debt by introducing a new devalued domestic currency. 
Larger economic fragility (as indicated by higher intraday volatility of stock market 
returns) increases the incentive to leave the eurozone and restore the competitiveness of 
the domestic economy through external devaluation (rather than the long-lasting process 
of internal devaluation). The relationship between stock market volatility and real 
economic activity has been well documented in the literature (e.g. Errunza and Hogan, 
1998; Engle et al., 2013). 
                                                          
31 Eijffinger et al. (2018) highlight that the cost of leaving the eurozone are unknown until the first country 
leaves the union. Therefore, they cannot be monitored by ADR investors in a way similar to the incentive 
to leave the eurozone.  
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To obtain a single variable that comprises the different incentives to leave the 
eurozone, we calculate the first principal component out of three market-based factors: 
the 10-year sovereign bond yield spread (relative to Germany),32 the returns of the 
country’s bank stock index, and the intraday volatility of the local stock index. Intraday 
stock market volatility is calculated using five-minute ticks from Thomson Reuters Tick 
History. Data on bank indices are also taken from Thomson Reuters Tick History. 
Sovereign yield spreads are taken from Thomson Reuters Eikon. 
These measures are available at high frequency and thus can be used in an asset 
pricing framework of ADRs. ADR investors can monitor them in real time when 
assessing eurozone exit risk. This would not be the case for macro data (e.g. inflation or 
productivity) that are not available in high frequency and cannot be monitored in real 
time. 
Since we expect each of these three factors to have a distinct influence on each of 
the countries in our sample, we conduct the PCA for each country separately so that the 
eigenvectors are allowed to vary between countries. We obtain the country-specific 
financial and economic vulnerability index (VUL) by multiplying the respective values of 
each of the three variables considered with the corresponding values of the eigenvector 
derived from the PCA: 
𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜆𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑗 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆Δ𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗 ∗ ∆𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜆∆𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑗 ∗ ∆𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡   (3.4) 
 where 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑗,𝑡 depicts intraday stock market volatility of country 𝑗 on day 𝑡, ∆𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑗,𝑡 the daily return in the respective country’s banking index and  ∆𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑗,𝑡 the daily 
change in the respective country’s sovereign yield spread against Germany for a maturity 
                                                          
32 For Germany, we use CDS with maturity of ten years instead. 
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of ten years. Table 3.1 shows the resulting values of the eigenvectors and the number of 
observations by country. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criterion exceeds the critical threshold 
of 0.50 for all countries in our sample. Also, we conduct Bartlett’s test of sphericity 
rejecting the null of the correlation matrix being equal to the identity matrix at the 1% 
level for every country in our sample. Both conditions necessary for the reduction of the 
data from three dimensions into one single principal component are therefore met. Figure 
A3.1 to Figure A3.6 in the appendix of this chapter illustrate the evolution of the country-
specific vulnerability indicators over time. 
Table 3.1: Eigenvectors of 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 
Country 𝝀𝑺𝑴𝑽𝒋   𝝀𝚫𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒋  𝝀∆𝑺𝒐𝒗𝒋   Observations 
Greece 0.40 -0.65 0.64 1,841 
Ireland 0.28 -0.69 0.67 1,815 
Italy 0.31 -0.68 0.66 1,853 
Portugal 0.41 -0.69 0.60 1,902 
Spain 0.31 -0.69 0.65 1,865 
Germany33 0.37 -0.68 0.63 1,843 
Notes: Eigenvectors of country-specific financial and economic vulnerability indicator 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 , resulting from principal 
component analysis of intraday stock market volatility, daily return of the country-specific bank index and the daily 
change in the sovereign yield spread as described in 3.2.2. 
3.2.3 Data and results 
Our panel consists of 17 level II and III ADRs from the five GIIPS countries: Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain as well as Germany over the period January 1st 2008 to 
June 30th 2015.34 Table A3.2 in the appendix of this chapter lists the ADRs used in the 
analysis. As a placebo test, we also apply our approach to Germany for which we would 
not expect any sizable risk to leave the eurozone. 
We identify potential pairs of ADRs and underlying stocks using information from 
the ADR databases of JP Morgan and the Bank of New York Mellon, as well as from 
                                                          
33 Since the sovereign yield spread is zero by definition for Germany, we use data from CDS with ten years 
maturity instead. 
34 Our sample ends when the Greek stock market was closed in the course of introducing capital controls. 
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Thomson Reuters DATASTREAM. Following standard practice in the literature (e.g. 
Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010), we consider Level II and Level III ADRs only, thus 
excluding Level I ADRs as well as SEC Regulation S shares and private placements under 
SEC Rule 144a. 
We check for correct matches of ADRs with their respective underlying stock by 
regressing ADR returns on the return of their underlying and the USD/EUR exchange 
rate, making sure that the estimated coefficients are significant. We exclude observations 
with abnormal ADR returns below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles to ensure that our 
analysis is not driven by extreme outliers.  
Prices of ADRs and their respective underlyings, the EUR/USD spot exchange 
rate, S&P 500 and domestic stock indices are taken from Thomson Reuters Tick History. 
To guarantee the most synchronous match possible between prices, we consider the last 
value available prior to 3:00 pm UTC for each day because at that time the U.S. and all 
eurozone stock markets operate in regular mode. The only exception is Greece during 
DST, where we use the final prices prior to 2:00 pm UTC as otherwise an overlap of 
trading hours with the U.S. stock markets would not be guaranteed. 
 Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.6 illustrate the evolution of our eurozone exit risk measure, 
i.e. the semi-partial R² of 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡  estimated within the rolling regressions framework as 
described in section 3.2.1, over the sample period from January 1st, 2008 to June 30th, 
2015 by country. 
 
 
83 
Figure 3.1: Greek eurozone exit risk 
 
Figure 3.2: Irish eurozone exit risk 
 
Figure 3.3: Italian eurozone exit risk 
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Figure 3.4: Portuguese eurozone exit risk 
 
Figure 3.5: Spanish eurozone exit risk 
 
Figure 3.6: German eurozone exit risk 
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 The eurozone exit risk indicator shows remarkable time series variation for the 
crisis countries. Our indicator for the whole sample reaches its maximum for Greece at 
the end of July 2011, when a preliminary draft for the second bail-out package for Greece 
worth 109 bln. euro was approved at an EU summit. During that time, about 1.83% of the 
total variation of ADR returns was explained by Greek exit risk.35 Table 3.2 shows 
summary statistics of our exit risk measure by country. 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of eurozone exit risk by country (in percentage points) 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Germany 
Mean 0.18 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.00 
Standard Deviation 0.28 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.01 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 1.83 1.33 0.37 0.30 1.12 0.05 
Notes: Country-specific eurozone exit risk is identified as the semi-partial R² of the country-specific financial and 
vulnerability indicator 𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡 from eq. (3.3) using a rolling panel regressions window approach of 60 trading days, 
including all ADRs from the respective country (as described in section 3.2.1):  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑇 + 𝛽1,𝑗,𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷 +𝛽2,𝑗,𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑆 + 𝛽𝑗,𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡   + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 ,𝑗,𝑇 ∗ 𝑋𝑙,𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=3 +𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
 With a mean of about 0.18%, exit risk is significantly higher for Greece compared 
to other countries over the entire period from 2008 to June 2015. Exit risk for Spain is the 
second highest with an average of about 0.07%. Relatively high values of Spanish exit 
risk materialized during 2008 and 2009. In 2009, Spain ran a fiscal deficit of 11.4% of 
GDP. In June 2012, Spain was finally granted 100 bln. euro of rescue loans to recapitalize 
its banking system. Irish eurozone exit risk soars in the first quarter of 2010, reaching its 
peak on February 10th, 2010 with about 1.33%.36   
 For Portugal and Italy, our estimates of euro exit risk are relatively small 
compared to Greece and Spain, with an average of 0.03% and 0.01% respectively. 
However, regressing the country-specific exit risk estimates on country dummies using a 
                                                          
35 Please note that this percentage cannot be directly transformed into the probability that Greece would 
leave the eurozone.  
36 On February 19th, 2010, the Irish government was forced to take a 16% direct stake in Bank of Ireland. 
In May and June of the same year, the Irish government was forced to take a 18% stake of Anglo Irish Bank 
and doubled its stake in the Bank of Ireland to 36%. In 2010, Ireland ran a record fiscal deficit of 32% of 
GDP and on November 21, 2010, Ireland applied for financial aid from the EU and the IMF.  
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simple pooled OLS regression approach reveals that our exit risk measure is significantly 
higher for each of the five GIIPS countries as compared to Germany, which we include 
as a placebo test. Table 3.3 displays the results: 
Table 3.3: Results from regressing eurozone exit risk on country dummies 
 Exit risk 
Greece 0.16*** 
  (0.01) 
Ireland 0.05*** 
  (0.00) 
Italy 0.01* 
  (0.00) 
Portugal 0.02*** 
  (0.00) 
Spain 0.06*** 
  (0.00) 
Constant 0.01*** 
  (0.00) 
Observations 10,651 
R² 0.12 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating a pooled OLS model, regressing the estimates of country-specific eurozone 
exit risk obtained from estimating eq. (3.3) as described in section 3.2.1 on country dummies with Germany as the 
benchmark country. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels of significance, respectively.  
 Moreover, Table 3.2 reveals that euro exit risk is much more volatile for the GIIPS 
countries than for Germany. Thus, the country-specific incentive to leave the eurozone 
appears to be priced in the ADRs of GIIPS countries (in different intensities) indicating 
exit risk, while this is not the case for Germany. Our results indicate that ADR investors 
do not perceive a significant risk that Germany opts to leave the eurozone. Here, it is 
important to distinguish between the two concepts of country-specific eurozone exit risk 
and overall eurozone break-up risk. Of course, German ADRs should also be affected by 
redenomination risk in the sense that if the whole eurozone broke up and Germany 
introduced its own currency, it would probably appreciate against the U.S. dollar and we 
should therefore observe positive ADR returns. However, we do not identify this within 
our empirical framework since we control for this break-up risk component by including 
the vulnerability indicator of the five GIIPS countries as a control variable for Germany. 
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Also, the unexplained fraction of ADR returns does not correlate with the German 
financial and economic vulnerability indicator. For Italy, our result of a low eurozone exit 
risk may also be explained by the systemic importance of Italy and the fact that we 
account for financial vulnerabilities of the remaining four GIIPS countries.   
3.3 Exposure to eurozone exit risk in the banking sector 
In this section, we test whether eurozone exit risk has an impact on the stocks of European 
banks outside the GIIPS countries. The eurozone exit of one country would negatively 
affect a bank in another country if this bank has direct exposure to the country in question, 
e.g. in the form of sovereign exposure or private credit exposure. The eurozone exit of 
the respective country would cause balance sheet losses to the bank, e.g. due to 
redenomination losses, write-downs on loans (e.g. due to liquidity driven defaults in the 
exiting country) or price losses on bond holdings in the exiting country. At the same time, 
there are most likely also indirect effects of euro exit risk of the GIIPS countries. The 
decision of a country to leave the eurozone might lead to severe financial distress in the 
entire European banking system. Therefore, the GIIPS countries’ exit risk might even 
affect banks without direct exposure to the respective country. 
 We test whether bilateral asset holdings of banks can help explain the exit risk 
exposure of individual banks. We would expect that banks with higher credit exposure to 
the crisis countries should be affected more severely than banks with little to no credit 
exposure. To test this empirically, we consider all listed banks outside the GIIPS countries 
that were subject to the 2011 EU-wide stress test conducted by the European Banking 
Authority (EBA). Our sample includes 28 banks from 14 countries in the EU, including 
non-eurozone banks. Table A3.3 in the appendix of this chapter provides an overview 
together with bilateral credit risk information for these banks.  
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 We consider “Total Exposure at Default” (EAD) as provided by the EBA Stress 
Test Results 2011 with the information code “33021". This includes exposure “for 
securitisation transactions, counterparty credit risk, sovereigns, guaranteed by sovereigns, 
public sector entities, central banks, equities, etc.” (EBA 2011). We scale this exposure 
variable by dividing it by “Total Assets” (information code “30029”). 
 To test for the impact of the eurozone exit risk of the five GIIPS countries on 
European bank stocks outside the GIIPS countries and to investigate the relevance of 
bilateral asset claims (as measured using holdings of sovereign bonds and credit claims) 
for the exposure to eurozone exit risk of the GIIPS countries, we estimate panel 
regressions with monthly stock returns of the 28 banks in our sample. Using a panel 
regression framework allows us to simultaneously include the changes in exit risk of all 
five GIIPS countries as well as their interaction with the bilateral credit exposure of the 
respective bank to the respective GIIPS country. Our regression equation looks as 
follows: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 =  𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑥 𝐸𝐴𝐷,𝑗∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑗5𝑗=1   +𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑗 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙,𝑡 𝑋𝑙,𝑡  𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
(3.5) 
 where ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 denotes the change in log exit risk of the respective GIIPS 
country,  ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡  𝐿𝑙=1 represents a set of control variables (returns of the VSTOXX, 
EUR/USD exchange rate, the respective home country stock index, the EUROSTOXX 
Banks, ∆ sovereign yield spread of the respective country and the first principal 
component of the ∆ of sovereign yield spreads of the GIIPS countries). We include bank 
fixed effects in all specifications and additional year (quarter) fixed effects in 
specifications (6) and (7). Table 3.4 summarizes the results. 
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Table 3.4: Results for the panel of individual bank stock returns: Interaction between ∆ Exit Risk and EAD  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆ Exit Risk Greece 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0001 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
∆ Exit Risk Greece x EAD Greece -0.0078** -0.0079** -0.0079** -0.0085** 
  (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
∆ Exit Risk Ireland -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009 
  (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
∆ Exit Risk Ireland x EAD Ireland -0.0409*** -0.0410*** -0.0410*** -0.0410** 
  (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0149) 
∆ Exit Risk Italy -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0005 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
∆ Exit Risk Italy x EAD Italy 0.0289 0.0289 0.0287 0.0284 
  (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0477) (0.0478) 
∆ Exit Risk Portugal -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
∆ Exit Risk Portugal x EAD Portugal 0.1248 0.1240 0.1234 0.1279 
  (0.3072) (0.3060) (0.3062) (0.3037) 
∆ Exit Risk Spain -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
∆ Exit Risk Spain x EAD Spain -0.0326 -0.0326 -0.0325 -0.0325 
  (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0312) 
Return Stock Index 0.7978*** 0.7975*** 0.7981*** 0.8448*** 
  (0.0498) (0.0501) (0.0493) (0.0573) 
Return EUROSTOXX Banks 0.4428*** 0.4425*** 0.4458*** 0.4937*** 
  (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0581) (0.0571) 
∆ Sovereign Spread  -0.0275 -0.0289 -0.0798 
   (0.1278) (0.1277) (0.1293) 
Return Exchange Rate   0.0199 -0.0542 
    (0.0617) (0.0621) 
Return VSTOXX    0.0746*** 
     (0.0130) 
∆ Sovereign Spread GIIPS     
      
Constant -0.0043*** -0.0043*** -0.0043*** -0.0040*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Observations 2,363 2,363 2,363 2,363 
Number of banks 28 28 28 28 
Bank FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE NO NO NO NO 
Quarter FE NO NO NO NO 
R² 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 
Notes: This table reports the panel estimation results of the regression model outlined in eq. (3.5): 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖 +∑ 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑥 𝐸𝐴𝐷,𝑗∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑗 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡5𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 ,𝑡 𝑋𝑙,𝑡  𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the monthly bank 
stock returns of non-GIIPS banks are regressed on the changes in log eurozone exit risk of the five GIIPS countries, 
the interactions between the change in log eurozone exit risk of the respective country and the credit risk exposure of 
the respective bank to the respective country, a set of control variables (returns of the VSTOXX, EUR/USD exchange 
rate, the respective home country stock index, the EUROSTOXX Banks, ∆ sovereign yield spread of the respective 
country and the first principal component of the ∆ of sovereign yield spreads of the GIIPS countries), bank fixed effects 
and quarter/year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Results for the panel of individual bank stock returns: Interaction between ∆ Exit Risk and 
EAD (continued)  
 (5) (6) (7) 
∆ Exit Risk Greece -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
∆ Exit Risk Greece x EAD Greece -0.0083** -0.0081*** -0.0076** 
  (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
∆ Exit Risk Ireland 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 
  (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) 
∆ Exit Risk Ireland x EAD Ireland -0.0408** -0.0407** -0.0412** 
  (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0151) 
∆ Exit Risk Italy -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0003 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
∆ Exit Risk Italy x EAD Italy 0.0283 0.0286 0.0287 
  (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0470) 
∆ Exit Risk Portugal -0.0016*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
∆ Exit Risk Portugal x EAD Portugal 0.1284 0.1273 0.1372 
  (0.3057) (0.3052) (0.3003) 
∆ Exit Risk Spain -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
∆ Exit Risk Spain x EAD Spain -0.0326 -0.0325 -0.0318 
  (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0321) 
Return Stock Index 0.8523*** 0.8459*** 0.8255*** 
  (0.0589) (0.0614) (0.0598) 
Return EUROSTOXX Banks 0.4737*** 0.4876*** 0.4679*** 
  (0.0552) (0.0563) (0.0548) 
∆ Sovereign Spread -0.0494 -0.0471 -0.0017 
  (0.1257) (0.1264) (0.1241) 
Return Exchange Rate -0.0602 -0.0582 -0.0706 
  (0.0605) (0.0596) (0.0709) 
Return VSTOXX 0.0806*** 0.0846*** 0.0683*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0140) (0.0124) 
∆ Sovereign Spread GIIPS -0.0022* -0.0026* -0.0013 
  (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
Constant -0.0041*** -0.0011 0.0038 
  (0.0005) (0.0064) (0.0057) 
Observations 2,363 2,363 2,363 
Number of banks 28 28 28 
Bank FE YES YES YES 
Year FE NO YES NO 
Quarter FE NO NO YES 
R² 0.57 0.57 0.58 
Notes: This table reports the panel estimation results of the regression model outlined in eq. (3.5): 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖 +∑ 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑥 𝐸𝐴𝐷,𝑗∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑗 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡5𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 ,𝑡 𝑋𝑙,𝑡  𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 where the monthly bank 
stock returns of non-GIIPS banks are regressed on the changes in log eurozone exit risk of the five GIIPS countries, 
the interactions between the change in log eurozone exit risk of the respective country and the credit risk exposure of 
the respective bank to the respective country, a set of control variables (returns of the VSTOXX, EUR/USD exchange 
rate, the respective home country stock index, the EUROSTOXX Banks, ∆ sovereign yield spread of the respective 
country and the first principal component of the ∆ of sovereign yield spreads of the GIIPS countries), bank fixed effects 
and quarter/year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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 We find strong evidence that Portuguese exit risk has a significant negative 
unconditional impact on European bank stocks outside the GIIPS countries. Results are 
not only statistically, but also economically highly significant. A one standard deviation 
increase in Portuguese exit risk decreases monthly stock returns by about 0.45% - 0.57%. 
Testing for bilateral credit risk exposure as a conditioning channel, we identify a 
significant negative interaction between exit risk and bilateral credit risk exposure of the 
respective non-GIIPS bank to Greece and Ireland, indicating that banks with a higher 
bilateral credit risk exposure to these two countries are significantly more affected by 
Greek and Irish exit risk.37 Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 illustrate the marginal effects of 
changes in Greek (Irish) exit risk on bank stock returns over the 5% to 95% range of 
bilateral credit risk exposure to Greece (Ireland). 
For Greece and Ireland, we find that banks with little or no direct bilateral credit 
risk exposure do not respond significantly to exit risk. However, banks’ exit risk exposure 
increases in their bilateral credit risk exposure, meaning that banks with higher bilateral 
credit risk exposure respond more negatively to the exit risk of the respective country. 
We use two examples of banks to illustrate the magnitude of this effect. 
The Dutch-based ING Groep NV is one example for a bank without direct bilateral 
credit risk exposure to Ireland. Therefore, there is no statistically significant impact of 
Irish exit risk on stock returns. However, for Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, the bank 
with the highest bilateral credit risk exposure to Ireland outside the GIIPS countries 
(10.58% of total assets), monthly stock returns decrease by about 0.71%, given a one 
standard deviation increase in Irish exit risk.  
                                                          
37 One potential explanation why we identify an unconditional impact of Portuguese exit risk, but no 
significant interaction with bilateral credit risk exposure might be that banks outside the GIIPS country 
have very little credit risk exposure to Portugal in general so there is not a lot of cross-sectional variation.  
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We do not find significant evidence that banks located in non-GIIPS countries are 
affected by eurozone exit risk of Italy and Spain. A possible explanation may be that 
banks are sufficiently hedged against the exit risk of these countries. Moreover, our 
findings suggest that several European banks do not sufficiently hedge their exposure to 
the eurozone exit risk of Greek, Ireland and Portugal. Our analysis therefore provides 
valuable insights for banking regulation. 
Figure 3.7: Marginal effects of ∆ Exit Risk Greece over the 5% to 95% range of EAD Greece  
 
Notes: This figure reports the marginal effect (solid line) of the change in log eurozone exit risk of Greece on non-
GIIPS bank stock returns conditional on the level of bilateral asset holdings of the bank in Greece to total banking 
assets and the 90% confidence intervals according to Specification 7 of Table 3.4. The 5% to 95% range of EAD Greece 
is displayed on the x-axis. Grey-shaded areas denote significance at the 10% level. 
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Figure 3.8: Marginal effects of ∆ Exit Risk Ireland over the 5% to 95% range of EAD Ireland  
 
Notes: This figure reports the marginal effect (solid line) of the change in log eurozone exit risk of Ireland on non-
GIIPS bank stock returns conditional on the level of bilateral asset holdings of the bank in Ireland to total banking 
assets and the 90% confidence intervals according to Specification 7 of Table 3.4. The 5% to 95% range of EAD Ireland 
is displayed on the x-axis. Grey-shaded areas denote significance at the 10% level. 
3.4 Exposure to eurozone exit risk in the non-financial sector 
Eurozone exit would be associated with a number of macroeconomic shocks, including 
devaluation of the new domestic currency, disintegration of domestic capital markets, and 
changes in expected inflation and economic growth. Since these changes in the 
macroeconomic environment will affect the cash flows of companies, the returns on their 
stocks will be affected by exit risk. In the following, we empirically investigate the 
exposure of non-financial firms to domestic eurozone exit risk at the individual company 
level and study how company-specific characteristics determine this exposure.  
Since we are not aware of existing studies empirically investigating the impact of 
eurozone exit risk on the performance of single companies, we cannot lean on existing 
hypotheses about the cross-sectional heterogeneity of exit risk exposure among 
companies. Given that the domestic currency would depreciate sharply after exiting the 
eurozone, we lean on the literature investigating the impact of currency depreciations on 
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stock performance of companies (e.g. Forbes, 2002a; Desai et al., 2008). We use a similar 
set of potential company-specific determinants of euro exit risk exposure as in Forbes 
(2002a), although the hypothesized impact may differ due to our focus on eurozone exit 
risk, while Forbes (2002a) studies large depreciations in emerging markets.  
Our sample consists of 355 non-financial stocks from Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. We consider all stocks included in the DATASTREAM sector 
indices. We begin by testing for an unconditional impact of domestic euro exit risk on 
stock performance. We estimate the following panel regressions with company fixed 
effects and robust standard errors: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∆ 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡  (3.6) 
 We regress the monthly stock return of company 𝑖 from country 𝑗 and industry 𝑠 
on the change in log domestic eurozone exit risk, as well as on a set of country-specific 
control variables (return of the domestic stock market and the change in the domestic 
sovereign yield spread) and a set of control variables for the whole eurozone (the returns 
of the VSTOXX, EUROSTOXX, an industry index, and the EUR/USD exchange rate). 
We include company fixed effects as well as year, quarter, country x year or country x 
quarter fixed effects to account for the general dynamics of the euro crisis. The left panel 
of Table 3.5 summarizes the results for all stocks from the GIIPS countries for the full 
sample from January 2008 to June 2015, the right panel summarizes the results for the 
subsample from January 2008 to July 2012 when Mario Draghi held his famous 
“whatever it takes”-speech. 
We find robust evidence that stocks in the GIIPS countries are significantly 
negatively affected by domestic exit risk. Results are not only statistically, but also 
economically highly significant. For the entire sample period, a one standard deviation 
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increase in domestic ∆ exit risk (i.e. 2.85) lowers monthly stock returns by about 0.16% 
to 0.24%. For the subsample from January 2008 to July 2012, domestic eurozone exit risk 
had an even larger impact on stock performance: a one standard deviation in domestic ∆ exit risk (i.e. 2.45) lowers monthly stock returns by about 0.46% to 0.60%.   
Therefore, our findings are in line with the theoretical model of Kriwoluzky et al. 
(2015) predicting that exit expectations have adverse effects on the real economy. As a 
robustness check, we include stocks of Financials into our analysis. The number of 
companies increases to 408. The significant negative impact of domestic exit risk on stock 
performance remains robust even after including financial stocks, as the Table A3.4 in 
the appendix of this chapter demonstrates.  
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In the next step, we aim to explain the individual exposures to eurozone exit risk 
with company-specific characteristics, controlling for country and industry membership. 
Therefore, we follow a two-step estimation strategy. In the first step, we run a time-series 
regression for each stock in our sample, regressing the return of stock 𝑖 from country 𝑗 
and sector 𝑠 on the change in the home country’s log exit risk. 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 + 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 ∆𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠,𝑡  (3.7) 
By running these time-series regressions for each of the stocks in our sample, we 
obtain one estimate of βexit risk,i,j,s  for each stock. In the next step, we explain the cross-
section of estimated βexit risk,i,j,s with a set of company-specific variables including country 
and industry fixed effects: 
𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑙,𝑖 𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠   (3.8) 
We account for the following company characteristics: Liquidity (Short-Term 
Debt/Cash), Size (log Total Assets), Capital Endowment (Equity/Total Assets), 
Profitability (Return on Assets), Foreign Sales to Total Sales, a Tradables Industry 
dummy, and Labor Intensity (Total Assets to Employees). All variables are measured as 
averages over the whole sample period from January 2008 to June 2015. Descriptive 
evidence and sources of the company-specific variables used are summarized in Table 
A3.5 in the appendix of this chapter. These company characteristics should determine the 
effect of eurozone exit risk on company performance as measured by stock returns. For 
example, companies with a lower level of short-term debt to cash should be better able to 
manage a probable liquidity shock associated with eurozone exit and therefore should be 
less negatively exposed to exit risk than more illiquid companies with large short-term 
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debt. Larger companies might also be less affected by domestic exit risk since they might 
be better able to diversify risks. Forbes (2002a) argues that larger firms are more likely 
to have access to financing during lending contractions, which might be a realistic 
scenario in the course of a eurozone exit. Also, small companies might be more likely to 
go bankrupt due to the economic disruptions that would accompany a eurozone exit, 
which might lead to higher market shares and higher profitability of large companies in 
the aftermath of a eurozone exit. Likewise, companies with higher levels of capital and 
profitability may be better able to manage and survive eurozone exit. For Foreign Sales, 
the Tradable industry dummy, and labor intensity the hypothesized impact of Eurozone 
exit is less trivial and can go in both directions. Table 3.6 summarizes the results from the 
cross-sectional regressions as described in equation (3.8) for all non-financial stocks from 
the GIIPS countries. 
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Table 3.6: Company-specific determinants of exit risk exposures of non-financial firms in the GIIPS 
countries 
Notes: This table reports the cross-sectional estimation results of the regression model outlined in eq. (3.8): 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙  𝑋𝑙,𝑖  𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 where the company-specific estimates of eurozone exit risk exposure 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 (obtained by estimating a separate time-series regression for each stock as outlined in eq. (3.7)) of non-
financial stocks in the GIIPS countries are regressed on averages of the company-specific variables short-term 
debt/cash, log of total assets, return on assets, equity/total assets, a tradables dummy, total assets/employees, foreign 
sales/total sales as well as country and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Note 
that in specification 5, the number of observations reduces to 345 since the ratio foreign sales to total sales is not 
available for ten non-financial firms in our sample. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. 
We find robust evidence that liquidity and company size significantly determine 
company-specific eurozone exit risk exposure. There is a significantly negative relation 
between the ratio of Short-Term Debt/Cash and company-specific exit risk exposure. The 
more illiquid a company is, i.e. the higher its ratio of Short-Term Debt/Cash, the higher 
is its exposure to euro exit risk, i.e. the more negatively its returns are affected if euro exit 
risk rises.38 High cash reserves serve as an insurance against economic shocks. If a 
company is low on cash relative to its short-term debt, it will be more vulnerable to the 
                                                          
38 This finding is also in line with Kriwoluzky et al. (2015) who show that exit expectations lead to increases 
in corporate refinancing costs.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Short-Term 
Debt/Cash 
-0.000002*** -0.000003*** -0.000003*** -0.000004*** -0.000004*** 
  (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000001) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.000460*** 0.000470*** 0.000386** 0.000403** 0.000336** 
  (0.000141) (0.000161) (0.000152) (0.000166) (0.000169) 
Return On Assets 0.002797 0.002554 0.002655 0.002714 0.000576 
  (0.006512) (0.006373) (0.005572) (0.005395) (0.005183) 
Equity/Total Assets -0.001197 -0.001001 -0.000185 0.000051 0.000922 
  (0.001516) (0.001488) (0.001414) (0.001428) (0.001423) 
Tradabables 0.000743 0.000781 0.000508 0.000280 0.000181 
  (0.000517) (0.000632) (0.000482) (0.000603) (0.000633) 
Total Assets/ 
Employees 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
  (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) (0.000000) 
Foreign Sales/ 
Total Sales 
    0.000554 
      (0.001018) 
Constant -0.005058** -0.008013*** -0.005225** -0.007267*** -0.006522** 
  (0.002139) (0.002493) (0.002156) (0.002601) (0.002612) 
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES 
Industry FE NO YES NO YES YES 
Observations 355 355 355 355 345 
R² 0.06 0.1 0.21 0.24 0.24 
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economic shocks following a eurozone exit. Domestic capital markets will disintegrate 
following eurozone exit and domestic banks will be more reluctant to lend out new loans 
to domestic companies. Domestic firms will find it difficult to roll over their short-term 
debt and to finance their business operations. Therefore, companies with low cash 
reserves relative to their short-term debt (i.e. with a high ratio of Short-Term Debt/Cash) 
will be those most likely driven into severe solvency problems or even bankruptcy 
following a eurozone exit.  
In addition, we identify a significant positive relation between company size 
(measured by log total assets) and exit risk exposure, indicating that larger firms are less 
negatively affected by domestic exit risk. This might be because larger firms are better  
able to diversify the risks associated with a eurozone exit risk and are more likely to have 
access to finance during lending contractions (Forbes, 2002a). Therefore, larger firms are 
also less likely to face bankruptcy in the aftermath of a eurozone exit. These findings are 
robust to accounting for country and industry membership and including a large set of 
additional company-specific variables as controls.  
We do not find significant effects for the remaining company characteristics 
indicating that a reduction of the short-term debt to cash ratio may be the most efficient 
strategy to shield a company against eurozone exit risk and the associated risk of liquidity 
driven default. 
Similar to our analysis of the unconditional impact of domestic exit risk on stock 
performance presented above, we include stocks from the financial sector from our 
analysis as a robustness check. Again, the hypotheses on company-specific determinants 
of exit risk exposure might be different for financial stocks. In addition, financials might 
act as outliers with regard to certain company-specific factors such as Total Assets/Total 
Employees and therefore might have a substantial impact on the results of this analysis. 
 
101 
However, our results remain robust to the inclusion of financial stocks as Table A3.6 in 
the appendix of this chapter demonstrates. 
As a further robustness check, we test whether the negative relation between the 
ratio of Short-Term Debt/Cash and company-specific exit risk exposure as well as the 
positive relation with company size also hold using a different econometric approach. 
Instead of conducting a two-step regression approach as described above, we test an 
interaction model where we regress the monthly returns of stocks in the GIIPS countries 
on the change in domestic risk, the same set of company-specific fundamentals that we 
tested above in the cross-sectional regressions as well as their interaction with the change 
in log domestic exit risk and a set of additional control variables. As Table A3.7 in the 
appendix of this chapter demonstrates, the interactions between the change in domestic 
exit risk and Short-Term Debt/Cash (log Total Assets) are also significantly negative 
(positive).  
3.5 Conclusion 
We exploit ADR investors’ exposure to potential losses associated with eurozone exit to 
derive a novel measure of eurozone exit risk. Our exit risk measure is based on the fraction 
of ADR returns that is explained by the variation in economic incentives to leave the 
eurozone. Using 17 level II and III ADRs in the period January 2008 to June 2015, we 
find that our exit risk measure is significantly higher and more volatile for the GIIPS 
countries than for Germany, which we include as a placebo test. Investigating the 
determinants of the exposure to euro exit risk for 28 European bank stocks outside the 
GIIPS countries, we find that Portuguese exit risk has a significant negative unconditional 
impact on bank stocks. At the same time, banks with higher credit risk exposure to Greece 
and Ireland are more adversely affected by the exit risk of these countries. This finding 
offers valuable insights to bank regulators since they suggest that several European banks 
 
102 
do not sufficiently hedge their exposure to the eurozone exit risk of these three countries. 
For non-financial companies in the GIIPS countries, we find that higher domestic euro 
exit risk exerts a significantly negative impact on stocks returns. Lower short-term debt 
to cash ratios reduce companies’ exposure to eurozone exit risk indicating that investors 
regard liquidity driven defaults as a realistic scenario after eurozone exit and that a  
reduction in short-term debt relative to cash may shield companies from eurozone exit 
risk. Also, larger companies are less negatively affected by eurozone exit risk since they 
might be better able to diversify risk and to access financial markets after lending 
contractions associated with eurozone exit.   
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Table A3.1: Variables used in the first-stage regressions and their sources 
Variable Description Source 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 Daily log return of American Depositary Receipt. Thomson Reuters Tick History 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷   Daily log return of the underlying stock. Thomson Reuters Tick History 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑆  Daily log return of the EUR/USD exchange rate. Thomson Reuters Tick History 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑆𝐹𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠  Daily log return of a composite continuous EUR/USD future provided by CME. Thomson Reuters DATASTREAM 
𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑗,𝑡  Country specific market-based measure of financial and economic vulnerabilities that proxy the incentive to leave the eurozone. Calculated 
using PCA as described in 3.2.2. 
Own calculation. 
𝑉𝑈𝐿 𝐺𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡  Market-based measure of financial and economic vulnerabilities that proxy the incentive of the respective other four GIIPS countries to leave the 
eurozone. Calculated using PCA as described in 
3.2.2. 
Own calculation. 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡𝑆&𝑃 500  Daily log return of the S&P 500. Thomson Reuters Tick History 
∆𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡   
The ADR-underlying stock pair specific measure 
of idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the 
residuals from regressing the difference between 
USD returns of the ADR and its underlying on 
contemporaneous as well as one day lagged and 
leading values of the US stock market, the 
respective domestic stock market and the change 
in the EUR/USD exchange rate using a rolling 
window of 30 trading days, see eq. (1) in Gagnon 
and Karolyi (2010). 
Own calculation. 
∆𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅  Change in the bid-ask-spread of the ADR. Thomson Reuters Tick History ∆𝑏𝑖𝑑 − 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷   Change in the bid-ask-spread of the underlying stock. Thomson Reuters Tick History 
∆𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡  
Obtained by regressing the excess return (over the 
interest rate on 3M T-Bills) of the local index (in 
USD) of the respective eurozone country on the 
excess return of the MSCI World (in USD) using a 
rolling regressions framework over the past 30 
trading days. 
Own calculation. 
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Figure A3.1: Evolution of the Greek vulnerability indicator calculated as described in section 3.2.2 
 
Figure A3.2: Evolution of the Irish vulnerability indicator calculated as described in section 3.2.2 
 
Figure A3.3: Evolution of the Italian vulnerability indicator calculated as described in section 3.2.2 
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Figure A3.4: Evolution of the Portuguese vulnerability indicator calculated as described in section 3.2.2 
 
Figure A3.5: Evolution of the Spanish vulnerability indicator calculated as described in section 3.2.2 
 
Figure A3.6: Evolution of the German vulnerability indicator calculated as described in section 3.2.2 
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Table A3.2: ADRs in our sample by country 
Name_ADR RIC ADR 
Exchange 
ADR 
RIC 
Underlying 
First day Last day 
Germany 
Aixtron SE 1:1 AIXG.O NASDAQ AIXGn.DE 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Fresenius Medical Care  
AG & Co. KGaA 2:1 
FMS NYSE FMEG.DE 01/03/2009 06/30/2015 
SAP SE 1:1 SAP NYSE SAPG.DE 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Siemens AG 1:1 SIEGY.PK NYSE SIEGn.DE 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Greece 
National Bank of Greece 1:1 NBG.N NYSE NBGr.AT 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Ireland 
CRH plc 1:1 CRH NYSE CRH.I 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Ryanair plc 1:5 RYAAY.O NASDAQ RYA.I 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Italy 
Eni S.p.A. 1:2 E NYSE ENI.MI 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Luxottica S.p.A. 1:1 LUX NYSE LUX.MI 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Telecom Italia S.p.A. 1:10 TI NYSE TLIT.MI 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
Portugal 
Pharol SGPS SA 1:1 PTGCY.PK OTC PHRA.LS 01/03/2008 03/27/2015 
Spain 
Abengoa SA 2:1 ABGB.O NASDAQ ABG.MC 10/21/2013 06/30/2015 
Banco Santander SA 1:1 SAN NYSE SAN.MC 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
BBVA SA 1:1 BBVA.K NYSE BBVA.MC 01/05/2010 06/30/2015 
Grifols SA 1:1 GRFS.O NASDAQ GRLS.MC 06/03/2011 06/30/2015 
PRISA SA 1:1 PRIS.N NYSE PRS.MC 01/04/2011 09/22/2014 
Telefónica SA 1:1 TEF NYSE TEF.MC 01/03/2008 06/30/2015 
 
Table A3.3: List of banks in our sample 
 
EBA Code 
EAD (%) 
Bank GR IE IT PT ES 
Erste Group Bank AG at001 0.46 0.15 1.01 0.12 0.44 
Dexia SA be004 0.91 0.00 9.11 1.03 6.07 
KBC Groep NV be005 0.20 6.59 2.20 0.08 1.05 
Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. cy006 43.88 0.23 1.12 0.51 0.64 
Bank of Cyprus PCL cy007 26.77 0.12 0.64 0.00 0.21 
BNP Paribas SA fr013 0.43 0.39 6.98 0.41 1.72 
Crédit Agricole SA fr014 1.80 0.45 5.56 0.21 0.99 
Société Générale SA fr016 0.63 0.44 1.99 0.12 1.29 
Deutsche Bank AG de017 0.19 0.96 2.14 0.22 1.69 
Commerzbank AG de018 0.59 0.01 2.49 0.56 2.52 
Landesbank Berlin Holding AG de027 0.37 0.91 2.58 0.21 2.85 
Bank of Valetta plc mt046 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ING Groep NV nl047 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SNS Reaal Groep NV nl050 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.67 
Averages Non GIIPS Eurozone  5.86 0.79 2.77 0.27 1.55 
Danske Bank A/S dk008 0.00 3.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jyske Bank A/S dk009 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sydbank A/S dk010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OTP Bank Nyrt hu036 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DNB ASA no051 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PKO Bank Polski SA pl052 0.00 0.1 0.24 0.00 0.00 
Nordea Bank AB se084 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.09 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB se085 0.03 0.20 0.08 0.03 0.38 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB se086 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Swedbank AB se087 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc gb088 0.58 10.58 1.74 0.28 3.84 
HSBC Holdings plc gb089 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 
Barclays plc gb090 0.01 0.24 1.52 0.73 2.55 
Lloyds Banking Group plc gb091 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Averages Non Eurozone  0.07 0.94 0.33 0.07 0.52 
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Table A3.5: Sources and descriptive statistics of company-specific variables 
Variable Worldscope Code Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
All GIIPS Stocks 
Short-Term Debt/Cash WC03051/WC02005 16.55 106.27 0 1,781.53 
Log(Total Assets) WC08241 13.61 2.36 9.18 20.62 
Return On Assets WC08326 0.03 0.06 -0.44 0.33 
Equity/Total Assets WC02999 0.36 0.23 -0.53 0.97 
Foreign Sales/Total Sales WC08731 0.34 0.32 0 1 
Tradabables39 WC07021 (SIC-code) 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Total Assets/Employees WC08406 1,874.89 6145.209 16 89,396 
All GIIPS Stocks Excluding Financials 
Short-Term Debt/Cash WC03051/WC02005 15.13 107.13 0 1,781.53 
Log(Total Assets) WC02999 13.27 2.04 9.18 18.86 
Return On Assets WC08326 0.03 0.06 -0.44 0.33 
Equity/Total Assets WC08241 0.38 0.21 -0.53 0.90 
Foreign Sales/Total Sales WC08731 0.38 0.32 0 1 
Tradabables40 WC07021 (SIC-code) 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Total Assets/Employees WC08406 944.02 2,883.01 16 45,647.58 
 
Table A3.6: Robustness Check: Company-specific determinants of exit risk exposures in the GIIPS 
countries for all stocks (including financials) 
 (1) 
Short-Term Debt/Cash -0.000004*** 
  (0.000001) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.000269* 
  (0.000148) 
Return On Assets 0.001411 
  (0.004885) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.000793 
  (0.001259) 
Tradabables 0.000029 
  (0.000619) 
Total Assets/Employees 0.000000 
  (0.000000) 
Foreign Sales/Total Sales 0.000896 
  (0.001012) 
Constant -0.005574** 
  (0.002421) 
Country FE YES 
Industry FE YES 
Observations 392 
R² 0.27 
Notes: This table reports the cross-sectional estimation results of the regression model outlined in eq. (3.8): 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝛾𝑠 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙  𝑋𝑙,𝑖  𝐿𝑙=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 where the company-specific estimates of eurozone exit risk exposure 𝛽𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘,𝑖,𝑗,𝑠 (obtained by estimating a separate time-series regression for each stock as outlined in eq. (3.7)) of stocks 
in the GIIPS countries (including Financials) are regressed on averages of the company-specific variables short-term 
debt/cash, log of total assets, return on assets, equity/total assets, a tradables dummy, total assets/employees, foreign 
sales/total sales as well as country and industry fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
                                                          
39 Dummy variable classifying a company as producing either tradable goods (=1) or nontradable goods 
(=0). Classified according to their two-digit SIC code following Forbes (2002b). 
40 Dummy variable classifying a company as producing either tradable goods (=1) or nontradable goods 
(=0). Classified according to their two-digit SIC code following Forbes (2002b). 
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Table A3.7: Robustness Check: Panel regression with interaction of change in log domestic exit risk and 
company-specific fundamentals 
 (1) (2) 
∆ Exit Risk -0.0092*** -0.0048* 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) 
∆ Exit Risk x Short-Term Debt/Cash -0.0000* -0.0000** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
∆ Exit Risk x Log(Total Assets) 0.0006*** 0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) 
∆ Exit Risk x Return On Assets 0.0055 0.0035 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) 
∆ Exit Risk x Equity/Total Assets -0.0014 -0.0009 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) 
∆ Exit Risk x Foreign Sales/Total Sales  -0.0000* 
  (0.0000) 
∆ Exit Risk x Tradabables 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
∆ Exit Risk x Total Assets/Employees 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Short-Term Debt/Cash -0.0000*** 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log(Total Assets) -0.0083** -0.0132*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0038) 
Return On Assets 0.0394** 0.0429*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0163) 
Equity/Total Assets 0.0103 0.0187** 
 (0.0091) (0.0088) 
Foreign Sales/Total Sales  -0.0003*** 
  (0.0000) 
Total Assets/Employees -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Return Stock Index 0.5618*** 0.5812*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0227) 
Return Exchange rate 0.0069 0.0282 
 (0.0228) (0.0246) 
Return VSTOXX -0.0396*** -0.0330*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0054) 
∆ Sovereign Spread -0.0026 -0.0010 
 (0.0499) (0.0523) 
Constant 0.1154** 0.1823*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0517) 
Observations 25,699 21,759 
Number of stocks 355 345 
Stock FE YES YES 
Country x Year FE YES YES 
R² 0.22 0.23 
Notes: This table reports the panel estimation results of an interaction model where we regress the monthly returns of 
non-financial stocks in the GIIPS countries on the change in log domestic risk, the same set of company-specific 
fundamentals that we tested in the cross-sectional regressions as outlined in. eq. (3.8) as well as their interaction with 
the change in log domestic exit risk and the returns of the domestic stock index, VSTOXX, the EUR/USD exchange 
rate and the change in the domestic sovereign spread as additional control variables as well as stock and country x year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
of significance, respectively. 
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Chapter 4  
The impact of US monetary policy on managed exchange rates and 
currency peg regimes 
Abstract: I study the impact of US monetary policy on managed exchange rates and 
currency peg regimes by analyzing the pricing of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) 
around FOMC meetings. I identify a significant negative impact of US monetary surprises 
on abnormal ADR returns for currencies that are managed, which reflects changes in 
these currencies’ fundamental values due to US monetary policy shocks. In line with 
currency crises models of interest rate defence like Lahiri and Végh (2007), positive US 
monetary surprises increase the breakdown probability of currency pegs of countries 
characterized by low real GDP growth, fiscal deficits and a weak domestic banking 
sector. 
4.1 Introduction 
There is common agreement that US monetary policy has a significant impact on 
exchange rates (e.g., Dedola et al., 2017; Mueller et al., 2017). However, identifying the 
effects of US monetary policy shocks on managed exchange rates is nontrivial, since 
many central banks intervene in the foreign exchange market and thereby manipulate the 
value of the domestic currency (e.g. Fratzscher et al., 2019). The intervention prevents 
the official spot exchange rate from fully reflecting the change in the fundamental value 
of these currencies caused by the US monetary policy shocks.41 Consequently, existing 
studies (e.g. Hausman and Wongswan, 2011) might not fully capture the impact of US 
                                                          
41 For this paper, the fundamental value of a currency refers to the exchange rate that would materialize if 
there was no intervention by the domestic central bank and the exchange rate was fully determined by 
market force. 
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monetary policy shocks on managed exchange rates. 
In the extreme case of a currency peg to the U.S. dollar, there is, by definition, no 
change in the official spot exchange rate as long as the peg regime holds. However, an 
unexpected US policy rate increase might affect investors’ assessment of the stability of 
the currency peg regime and thus lead to a higher expected peg breakdown probability. 
To sustain the peg regime, the domestic central bank must mimic increases in the FED 
Funds Rate.42 Lahiri and Végh (2007) state that raising the domestic policy rate is 
associated with fiscal and output costs and leads to a deterioration of the domestic banking 
system. Second-generation currency crises models predict that domestic policy makers 
will opt to abandon a currency peg regime if the economic costs of maintaining the peg 
regime outweigh the benefits (e.g. Obstfeld, 1994; Bensaid and Jeanne, 1997).43 
 I introduce a novel empirical approach to identify the impact of US monetary 
policy on managed exchange rates and the stability of currency peg regimes. It builds on 
the idea that prices of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) reflect investors’ exchange 
rate expectations in managed exchange rate regimes (e.g. Kadiyala and Kadiyala, 2004; 
Arquette et al., 2008; Eichler et al., 2009; Maltritz and Eichler, 2010; Eichler, 2011). ADR 
investors consider the impact of US monetary policy on the fundamental value of 
currencies. A positive (negative) US monetary surprise will decrease (increase) the true 
fundamental value of any currency relative to the U.S. dollar. If the return of the spot 
exchange rate does not fully reflect this change in the fundamental value of the currency 
due to the intervention of the domestic central bank, the new fundamental value will be 
                                                          
42 While standard textbook models claim that this relation does not necessarily hold if capital flows are 
restricted, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. For example, Miniane and Rogers (2007) and Dedola et al. 
(2017) show that restrictions on capital flows do not insulate countries from US monetary policy shocks. I 
will discuss the role of capital account openness in the robustness check sections of this paper.  
43 This is not an exclusive feature of second-generation currency crises models, but can also be found in 
augmented first-generation models of interest rate defence (e.g. Flood and Jeanne, 2005; Lahiri and Végh, 
2007). 
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below (above) the current spot exchange rate of the currency. However, the domestic 
central bank might eventually cease its intervention in the foreign exchange market. 44 
Therefore, the risk of a sudden convergence of the spot exchange rate to the true 
fundamental value of the currency is reflected in abnormal ADR returns (e.g. Eichler and 
Roevekamp, 2018). In the extreme case of a currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, investors 
will perceive a higher reluctance of domestic policymakers to maintain the currency peg 
using an interest rate defence if they anticipate that the domestic government faces high 
economic costs of mimicking an unexpected US policy rate increase. Consequently, 
significant negative abnormal ADR returns will reflect a higher peg breakdown 
probability. For policy makers and investors, it is important to be aware of these 
differences between the current value of currencies and their true fundamental value. If 
the domestic central bank stops intervening in the foreign exchange market, there will be 
a sudden drop in the exchange rate, potentially causing severe losses to investors and real 
disruptions. 
To my best knowledge, I am the first to study deviations from the law of one price 
of ADRs around FOMC meetings and relate them to the exchange rate regime of the 
country from where the underlying stock of the ADR originates. I contribute to the 
existing literature in two ways. First, I introduce a new ADR-based methodology that 
allows identifying the impact of US monetary surprises on the fundamental values of 
currencies with managed exchange rate regimes. Second, I test the predictions of currency 
crises models of interest rate defence by applying this methodology to currencies pegged 
to the U.S. dollar and study how US monetary policy shocks affect the stability of these 
                                                          
44 There might be several reasons for that. According to first-generation currency crises models, the 
domestic central bank is forced to stop its intervention when foreign exchange reserves are depleted. 
According to second-generation currency crises models, the domestic policy maker will voluntarily decide 
to abandon a peg regime (and thus stop the intervention in the foreign exchange market), if the costs of 
maintaining the peg regime outweigh the benefits. 
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peg regimes, conditional on the current state of the domestic economy. The pricing of 
ADRs around FOMC meetings offers a unique setting that allows identifying how 
investors assess the probability that domestic policy makers opt to abandon the currency 
peg regime in response to the exogenous shock.  
I identify increases in the expected peg breakdown probability by negative 
abnormal ADR returns following positive US monetary surprises. By interacting with 
macro fundamentals that proxy the three dimensions of costs associated with raising the 
domestic policy rate following Lahiri and Végh (2007) (i.e. current real GDP growth, the 
fiscal balance, the current state of the banking system), I identify how investors assess the 
domestic policy makers’ willingness to raise the domestic policy rate. Higher costs of 
raising the domestic policy rate result in a higher reluctance to maintain the peg regime 
and thus lead to a higher expected peg breakdown probability. 
The empirical approach used in this paper provides a valuable tool to policy 
makers and investors that are eager to monitor assessments of currency peg stability, the 
government’s willingness to defend the peg regime and the risk of speculative attacks 
against the domestic currency in real-time. In addition, employing daily data of ADRs 
allows for a clean identification of the impact of US monetary shocks on managed  
exchange rate regimes (as compared to existing approaches using macro variables at 
lower frequency, e.g., Maćkowiak, 2007). One alternative way to identify currency risk 
could be to use prices of currency options and futures. However, as Nedeljkovic and 
Saborowski (2019) document, these are also affected by the intervention of the domestic 
central bank and therefore do not provide unbiased measures of currency risk. In contrast, 
prices of ADRs are not manipulated by the domestic central bank and can therefore serve 
as an unbiased measure of currency risk.45 
                                                          
45 Eichler (2011) shows that price discounts of Chinese cross-listed stocks are better able to forecast the 
yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate than forward exchange rates, especially at longer horizons. 
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 My paper adds to a large body of literature that studies the effects of US monetary 
policy shocks on equity markets in the US (e.g., Thorbecke, 1997; Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Lucca and Moench, 2015) and their global 
transmission (e.g., Kim, 2001; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Hausman and Wongswan, 
2011; Dedola et al., 2017; Han and Wei, 2018; Buch et al., 2019). It also adds to a strand 
of literature that analyzes deviations from the law of one price of ADRs and their 
underlying stocks during episodes of financial crises (e.g., Melvin, 2003; Kadiyala and 
Kadiyala, 2004; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004; Auguste et al., 2006; Arquette et al., 2008; 
Pasquariello, 2008; Eichler et al., 2009; Levy Yeyati et al., 2009). 
My sample includes daily data of 249 level II and level III ADRs from 31 countries 
over the period from 1996 to 2016, covering 168 FOMC meetings (2,866 observations by 
country and meeting in total). I find robust evidence that the impact of US monetary 
surprises on abnormal ADR returns differs significantly depending on the exchange rate 
regime of the country from where the underlying stock originates. US monetary surprises 
significantly negatively affect abnormal ADR returns for countries with managed 
currencies, whereas there is no significant effect for countries with freely floating 
currencies. A one standard deviation increase in US monetary surprises reduces abnormal 
ADR returns for countries with managed exchange rates by 12.5 to 13.3 basis points 
(equivalent to 0.13 to 0.14 standard deviations).46 These results are robust to the inclusion 
of various control variables to account for potential sources of deviations from the law of 
one price other than the exchange rate channel47 and a variety of robustness checks. 
                                                          
46 When judging the economic significance of this effect, it must be kept in mind that as long as arbitrage 
possibilities exist, abnormal ADR returns should not be significantly different from zero. However, it is not 
the focus of this paper to make a statement about whether profitable arbitrage possibilities exist in the ADR 
market around FOMC meetings. The economic significance of US monetary surprises is higher than for 
other control variables included in the analysis, except for the return of the local market. 
47 I control for limits to arbitrage (following Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010) as well as financial (dis-)integration 
(following Pasquariello, 2008). Furthermore, I include additional control variables that are specific to the 
domestic economy of the underlying and capture how the unexpected change in the FED Funds Rate affects 
the economic conditions in the domestic economy. These include the U.S. dollar return of the domestic 
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Next, I test the predictions of standard currency crises models of interest rate 
defence with respect to the stability of currency peg regimes. I find that following positive 
US monetary surprises, abnormal ADR returns are significantly more negative for peg 
regimes with low current real GDP growth compared to past growth, fiscal deficits and 
negative returns of the domestic banking index since the previous FOMC meeting. These 
results indicate that investors perceive high costs of maintaining the currency peg regime 
by raising the domestic policy rate and thus expect a higher breakdown probability. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the methodology, 
introduces the two central hypotheses of this paper and describes the data. Section 4.3 
investigates the impact of US monetary policy on managed exchange rates. Section 4.4 
studies how US monetary surprises affect the stability of currency pegs. Section 4.5 
concludes. 
4.2 Methodology, hypotheses and data 
4.2.1 Definition of abnormal ADR returns 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) represent ownership of a fixed number of 
underlying shares and provide the same rights (such as dividend claims and voting rights). 
While ADRs are denominated in U.S. dollars and trade in the United States, their 
underlying shares are denominated in local currency and trade on the local stock market. 
Since ADRs and their underlying shares can be converted into each other, the law of one 
price implies that prices of both should be equal when expressed in the same currency 
and adjusted for a fixed conversion ratio (Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010):    
                                                          
stock index and changes in the domestic sovereign yield and the domestic money market interest rate 
(potentially capturing an immediate or expected response of the domestic central bank to the monetary 
surprise in the US). Finally, I include the return of the US market and the change in the VIX as global 
control variables. 
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𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅,𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑃 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷∗𝛾𝑖,𝑗𝑆𝑗,𝑡   (4.1) 
with 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅,𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑃 and 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷 representing the prices of ADR 𝑖 from country 𝑗 and its 
corresponding underlying stock on day 𝑡, 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 is a fixed ADR-underlying pair-specific 
conversion parameter and 𝑆𝑗,𝑡 is the current spot exchange rate of the respective country 
from where the underlying originates in local currency units per U.S. dollar. Accordingly, 
the return of the ADR should equal the U.S. dollar return of the respective underlying: 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅,𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑃 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷 − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡𝑆   (4.2) 
Abnormal ADR returns represent deviations from the law of one price:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅,𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑃 = 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 − (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑈𝑁𝐷 − 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑗,𝑡𝑆 )    (4.3) 
Abnormal ADR returns differ from zero if actual ADR returns do not match ADR 
returns predicted by the returns of the underlying stock and the spot exchange rate.48 A 
priori, it is not clear how actual ADR returns deviate from predicted ADR returns around 
FOMC meetings. Existing literature documents the impact of US monetary surprises on 
stock prices and exchange rates (e.g., Thorbecke, 1997; Kim, 2001; Ehrmann and 
Fratzscher, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Lucca and 
                                                          
48 The focus of this paper is not to analyze whether profitable arbitrage possibilities around FOMC meetings 
exist in the ADR market. This question is difficult to answer empirically since it is unclear whether an ADR 
and its underlying stock can be traded in the exact same instance. In addition, I abstract from differences 
between bid and ask prices (although I will include the change in the bid-ask-spread of both the ADR and 
its underlying stock as control variables in the following analysis). Finally, price differences between 
predicted and actual ADR prices might not be large enough to cover the transaction cost of arbitrage 
transactions. 
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Moench, 2015; Mueller et al., 2017). In the following section, I will introduce the two 
central hypotheses of this paper. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
This paper studies the impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns, 
conditional on the exchange rate regime of the country from where the underlying stock 
of the ADR originates. I hypothesize that there is a significant difference between 
countries with a managed exchange rate regime (characterized by some degree of 
intervention of the domestic central bank in the foreign exchange market) and countries 
with a freely floating exchange rate regime (characterized by the absence of intervention 
by the domestic central bank in the foreign exchange market).  
There is common agreement that US monetary policy has an immediate effect on 
exchange rates (e.g., Hausman and Wongswan, 2011; Mueller et al., 2017). Following 
standard exchange rate models, (unexpected) US policy rate increases ceteris paribus lead 
to a lower fundamental value (defined as the exchange rate that would materialize if it 
was fully determined by market force and there was no intervention by the domestic 
central bank) of any currency relative to the U.S. dollar. However, the actual response of 
exchange rates to US monetary policy shocks depends on the exchange rate regime. For 
freely floating regimes, the return of the spot exchange rate – by definition – fully reflects 
the change in the fundamental value of the currency. However, for managed exchange 
rates, the return of the spot exchange rate might not fully reflect the change in the 
currency’s fundamental value either due to an immediate intervention of the domestic 
central bank or market participants’ expectation of future intervention. Hausman and 
Wongswan (2011) support this notion empirically by documenting that currencies with 
less flexible exchange rate regimes respond less to US monetary policy shocks.  
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The pricing of ADRs around FOMC meetings presents an ideal laboratory to 
identify the impact of US monetary policy on managed exchange rates. ADR investors 
do not only consider the current spot exchange rate, but also take into account their 
expectations of the future value of the exchange rate (e.g., Kadiyala and Kadiyala, 2004; 
Arquette et al., 2008; Eichler et al., 2009; Maltritz and Eichler, 2010; Eichler, 2011). A 
positive (negative) US monetary surprise decreases (increases) the true fundamental value 
of any currency relative to the U.S. dollar. If the return of the current spot exchange rate 
does not fully reflect this change in the fundamental value of the currency due to the 
intervention of the domestic central bank, the new fundamental value will be below 
(above) the current spot exchange rate. However, the domestic central bank might 
eventually either be forced to stop its intervention if its foreign reserves are depleted or it 
might voluntarily opt to switch its exchange rate regime to a more flexible one. Either 
way, abnormal ADR returns reflect the risk of a sudden convergence of the spot exchange 
rate to its fundamental value (Eichler and Roevekamp, 2018).  
In the case of a positive (negative) US monetary surprise, we should therefore 
observe negative (positive) abnormal returns for ADRs from countries with managed 
exchange rate regimes. For freely floating exchange rate regimes however, there is no 
reason for significant abnormal ADR returns due to this exchange rate channel since the 
return of the current spot exchange rate by definition fully reflects the change in the 
fundamental value of the currency (due to the absence of intervention by the domestic 
central bank).49 Therefore, ADRs from countries with freely floating exchange rate 
                                                          
49 The literature has provided empirical evidence of various reasons for deviations from the law of one price 
of ADRs beyond changes in the (expected) fundamental value of the underlying currency. These include 
the (dis-)integration of the domestic economy from the world economy (Pasquariello, 2008), capital control 
circumvention premia (e.g., Melvin, 2003; Auguste et al., 2006) as well as limits to arbitrage (Gagnon and 
Karolyi, 2010). As I will point out in more detail in the following section, I control for these other sources 
of deviations from the law of one price. 
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regimes are included as a placebo test and the first central hypothesis of this paper is as 
follows: 
(H1): Abnormal returns of ADRs from countries with managed exchange rates respond 
negatively to US monetary surprises. There are no significant effects for ADRs from 
countries with floating exchange rates. 
In the extreme case of a currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, there is no change in 
the current spot exchange rate due to an unexpected FOMC policy rate change as long as 
the peg regime holds. However, US monetary surprises might affect how investors assess 
the stability of a currency peg regime. To sustain a currency peg regime to the U.S. dollar, 
the domestic central bank must mimic policy rate changes by the FED. As predicted by 
standard currency crises models of interest rate defence, domestic policy makers will opt 
to abandon a currency peg regime if the economic costs of increasing the domestic policy 
rate outweigh the benefits of maintaining the currency peg regime. This will be the case 
if, following a positive US monetary surprise, domestic policy makers perceive high costs 
of increasing the domestic policy rate (e.g., Bensaid and Jeanne, 1997; Flood and Jeanne, 
2005; Lahiri and Végh, 2007). Lahiri and Végh (2007) consider three different 
dimensions of costs of increasing the domestic policy rate to defend a currency peg: fiscal 
cost, output cost and a further deterioration of an already weak banking system. 
Consequently, domestic policy makers might be especially reluctant to mimic US policy 
rate increases if the country currently runs a fiscal deficit, current real GDP growth is low 
and the domestic banking system is in a weak state. If investors perceive a high reluctance 
of domestic policy makers to raise the domestic policy rate, they will expect a higher 
breakdown probability of the currency peg, which will be reflected in negative abnormal 
ADR returns. ADR investors have a strong incentive to monitor the breakdown 
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probability of currency peg regimes since once the domestic policy makers opt to abandon 
the currency peg regime, the resulting sudden depreciation of the domestic currency 
would lead to severe losses to ADR investors (e.g. Eichler et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
second central hypothesis of this paper is as follows: 
(H2): Abnormal returns of ADRs from countries with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar 
respond negatively to positive US monetary surprises around FOMC meetings if the costs 
of mimicking the policy rate increase by the FED are high, i.e. current real GDP growth 
is low, the country runs a fiscal deficit or the domestic banking system is in a weak state. 
H2 hypothesizes a negative impact of positive US monetary surprises on abnormal 
ADR returns of countries with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, conditional on the 
current state of the economy. Positive US monetary surprises should not lead to 
significant negative abnormal ADR returns for countries with currencies pegged to the 
U.S. dollar if their economy currently is in a good state (i.e. characterized by fiscal 
surpluses, high real GDP growth and a solid state of the domestic banking system). For 
these countries, investors would not expect domestic policy makers to be reluctant to  
mimic the US policy rate increase.  
4.2.3 Data description 
To study the impact of policy rate decisions by the FOMC on abnormal ADR returns as 
precisely as possible, I calculate daily returns based on intraday data from Thomson 
Reuters Tick History. I consider the last values prior to 3 p.m. UTC as prices for the 
respective day.50 FOMC statements on meeting days are published at approximately 2:15 
p.m. ET.  
                                                          
50 I chose this time because most of the stock markets of the 31 countries in my sample operate in regular 
mode. Also, Gau and Wu (2017) show that price discovery in foreign exchange markets on days with US 
announcements is dominant during overlapping trading hours of London and New York. 
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Following Kuttner (2001), I derive US monetary surprises (i.e., unexpected 
changes in the FED Funds Rate) from FED Funds Futures that are settled at 4 p.m. CST.51 
Therefore, prices of FED Funds Futures already incorporate the monetary surprise of a 
FOMC meeting on the respective day, whereas this is not the case for the prices of ADRs 
and their underlying stocks. Therefore, I match abnormal ADR returns between day 𝑡 +1 (incorporating the FOMC decision) and day 𝑡 (not incorporating the FOMC decision) 
to monetary surprises on day 𝑡. 
I identify potential pairs of ADRs and underlying stocks using information from 
the ADR databases of JP Morgan and the Bank of New York Mellon, as well as from 
Thomson Reuters DATASTREAM. Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), I exclude 
Level I ADRs as well as SEC Regulation S shares and private placements under SEC 
Rule 144a. This yields a sample of 249 level II and III ADRs from 31 countries over the 
period from 1996 - 2016 (covering 168 FOMC meetings).  
4.3 The impact of US monetary surprises on managed exchange rates 
4.3.1 Results 
Before I test the impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional 
on the exchange rate regime as outlined in H1, I begin by testing for an unconditional 
impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns, regardless of the exchange 
rate regime of the underlying currency. Therefore, I estimate the following panel 
regression: 
                                                          
51 The payoff of FED Funds Futures is defined as 100$ minus the average effective overnight FED Funds 
Rate of the respective period of the future contract. Therefore, the futures rate 𝑓𝑡  (defined as 100$ minus 
the price of the respective futures contract) summarizes market participants’ expectations on day 𝑡 about 
the FED Funds Rate for the rest of the period. Monetary surprises on day 𝑡 are derived as suggested by eq. 
(7) in Kuttner (2001): 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚−𝑡 (𝑓𝑠,𝑡0 − 𝑓𝑠,𝑡−10 ), where daily changes in futures rates 
derived from FED Fund Futures that mature at the end of the month are corrected for the number of 
remaining days in the respective month 𝑚 − 𝑡. 
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𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=2 +𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (4.4) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the mean of abnormal returns over all ADRs from 
country 𝑗 for FOMC meeting 𝑡52 and 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 corresponds to the US 
monetary surprise of the respective FOMC meeting (calculated using the methodology 
proposed by Kuttner, 2001). ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑙=2  represents a large set of control variables, 𝜇𝑗,𝑎 a 
country x year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 the error term. Robust standard errors are clustered at 
the country level (spec. (1) to (4)) or by FOMC meeting (spec. (5)).53 Table 4.1 
summarizes the results of these panel regressions for different specifications including 
various control variables. The unconditional impact of US monetary surprises 
(irrespective of the exchange rate regime) on abnormal ADR returns around FOMC 
meetings is insignificant. 
  
                                                          
52 This approach is chosen to avoid potential bias resulting from the different number of ADRs by country 
in my sample. In the case of the ADR-underlying pair specific variables controlling for limits to arbitrage, 
I also consider the means of the measures over all ADRs from the respective country and FOMC meeting. 
For the eurozone, the means of all ADRs from EMU member countries for the respective FOMC meeting 
are used as aggregate measures. However, treating EMU member countries as individual observations does 
not significantly alter the results of this paper. 
53 Petersen (2009) shows that inferences in finance panel data sets might depend strongly on whether 
standard errors are clustered at the cross-sectional or the time dimension. Therefore, I ensure that the results 
presented in this paper are robust to using standard errors clustered at the country level and by FOMC 
meeting.  
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Table 4.1: The unconditional impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns around FOMC 
meetings 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monetary surprise -1.537 -1.554* -1.348 -1.349 -1.349 
  (1.022) (0.834) (0.830) (0.825) (0.976) 
Return US market  0.216*** 0.167*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
   (0.057) (0.048) (0.048) (0.032) 
Return local market  -0.173*** -0.176*** -0.173*** -0.173*** 
   (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.018) 
∆ VIX   -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ CAPM beta    0.002 0.001 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
∆ Sovereign yield   -0.200 -0.195 -0.195 
    (0.164) (0.168) (0.162) 
∆ Interest rate MM   0.001 0.000 0.000 
    (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
∆ Bid-ask ADR    0.003 0.003** 
     (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Bid-ask UND    0.021 0.021 
     (0.044) (0.038) 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk    0.178 0.178 
     (0.347) (0.264) 
Constant -0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 
No. of countries 31 31 31 31 31 
R² 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Country x Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
SEs clustered by  Country Country Country Country Meeting 
Notes: This table reports the panel estimation results of the regression model outlined in eq. (4.4):  𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑙 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=2 +𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the mean of abnormal returns over all ADRs of the respective country for the respective 
FOMC meeting and 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 corresponds to the monetary surprise of the respective FOMC meeting 
(following Kuttner, 2001). ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑙=2  represents a broad set of control variables, 𝜇𝑗,𝑎 a country x year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 the error term. Control variables include the returns of the US and the local market as well as first differences in 
VIX, the country-specific CAPM betas, sovereign yields, money market interest rates, bid-ask spreads of the ADR and 
its underlying as well as ADR-underlying pair specific idiosyncratic risk. Robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level (spec. (1) to (4)) and clustered by FOMC meeting (spec. (5)) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
Next, I study the impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns 
around FOMC meetings conditional on the exchange rate regime of the currency 
underlying the ADR. Analyzing abnormal ADR returns around FOMC meetings can help 
identify the impact of US monetary policy on investors’ assessment of the true 
fundamental value of currencies, which might not be fully reflected in the current spot 
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exchange rate of managed currencies. Using an interaction model, I distinguish ADRs by 
the exchange rate regime of their home country. Therefore, I estimate the following panel 
regression: 
𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽4𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽6𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽7𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1   + ∑ (𝛽9,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ (𝛽10,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡)  + ∑ (𝛽11,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡)+𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
(4.5) 
 where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the mean of abnormal returns over all ADRs from 
country 𝑗 for FOMC meeting 𝑡 and 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  corresponds to the US 
monetary surprise of the respective FOMC meeting (calculated using the methodology 
proposed by Kuttner, 2001). I distinguish the different exchange rate regimes based on 
the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) monthly coarse classification of de facto exchange rate regimes. 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if the country’s exchange rate regimes is 
classified as “3” in the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) de facto exchange rate classification  and the 
anchor currency is the U.S. dollar, and zero otherwise.54 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the country’s exchange rate regimes is classified as “1” or “2” in the Ilzetzki et 
                                                          
54 The Ilzetzki et al. (2019) coarse classification=”3” comprises the following items: “Pre announced 
crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%”; “De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal 
to +/-5%”; “Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and 
depreciation over time)” and “Managed floating”. 31.51% of the observations are classified as managed 
regimes with the U.S. dollar as anchor currency. Norway, Sweden (2008/09 – 2016/12), Switzerland 
(2001/05 – 2011/08 and 2015/02 –2016/12), Turkey (2000/08 – 2001/01) and the United Kingdom (1996/03 
– 2008/12) are also classified as “3” in the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) coarse classification for some years, but 
have the DEM/EUR as their anchor currency. Therefore, for my analysis, I include them into the base 
category of currencies that are freely floating against the U.S. dollar. However, this decision does not 
significantly change the results in this section. 
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al. (2019) de facto exchange rate classification and the anchor currency is the U.S. dollar, 
and zero otherwise.55,56 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡  is a dummy variable equal to one if the country’s 
exchange rate regimes is classified as “5” in the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) de facto exchange 
rate classification, and zero otherwise.57 After including dummy variables for managed 
regimes, peg regimes and freely falling regimes, freely floating exchange rate regimes 
(characterized by the absence of intervention of the domestic central bank) represent the 
base category for the analysis in this section. Therefore, the coefficient of the interaction 
between 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 and 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡 (𝛽5) measures how the impact of US 
monetary surprises for managed regimes differs from the impact for freely floating 
regimes. The marginal effect of US monetary surprises for managed regimes calculates 
as the sum of the unconditional effect (𝛽1) and the interaction effect (𝛽5). The significance 
of both, the interaction term as well as the marginal effect, will be assessed in the 
following. Table A4.1 in the appendix of this chapter provides an overview of the 
currencies in my sample and their exchange rate regime definition. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 represents 
a large set of control variables, 𝜇𝑗,𝑎 is a country x year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 is the error 
term. Interactions of 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  and all control variables with the dummy 
                                                          
55 The Ilzetzki et al. (2019) coarse classification=”1” or “2” comprises the following items: “No separate 
legal tender”; “Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement”; “Pre announced horizontal band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-2%”; “De facto peg”; “Pre announced crawling peg”; “Pre announced crawling 
band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%”; “De factor crawling peg” and “De facto crawling band that 
is narrower than or equal to +/-2%”. 19.85% of the observations are classified as peg regimes with the U.S. 
dollar as anchor currency. Denmark, Ireland (from 1996/01 to 1998/12), Italy (from 1996/03 to 1998/12), 
Sweden (from 2006/09 to 2008/08) and Switzerland (from 2011/09 to 2015/01) are also classified as “1” 
or “2” for some years in the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) coarse classification, but these currencies have the 
DEM/EUR as their anchor currency. Therefore, for my analysis, I include them into the base category of 
currencies that are freely floating against the U.S. dollar. However, this decision does not significantly 
change the results in this section.  
56 I obtain results similar to those in this section if I use one aggregate category for managed exchange rates 
(if the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) classification is equal to 1,2 or 3) and test this against freely floating exchange 
rates as the base category (controlling for freely falling episodes). 
57 This is a residual category for currencies that are “freely falling”, i.e. where i) year-on-year inflation 
exceeds 40% for 12 consecutive months or ii) currencies that depreciate by at least 25% month on month 
and the rate of depreciation is at least 10% higher than in the previous month. The six months following 
are also classified as “freely falling episodes”. 1.71% of the observations in my sample are classified as 
“freely falling” episodes.  
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variables describing the different exchange rate regimes are additionally included to allow 
for a heterogeneous impact of US monetary surprises and the control variables on 
abnormal ADR returns between different exchange rate regimes. Again, robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level (spec. (1) to spec. (4)) and by FOMC meeting (spec. 
(5)) are reported.  
I include various control variables to account for potential sources of deviations 
from the law of one price other than the exchange rate channel hypothesized in section 
4.2.2. The first set of control variables is specific to the ADR-underlying pair. Deviations 
from the law of one price might emerge if arbitrage possibilities are limited. Therefore, I 
follow Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) and include the change of the bid-ask-spread of both 
the ADR and its underlying stock as well as the change in ADR-specific idiosyncratic 
risk58 to control for changes in limits to arbitrage around FOMC meetings.  
I further include control variables that capture how the economic conditions in the 
home country of the underlying stock change around the respective FOMC meeting. 
These include the U.S. dollar return of the domestic stock index, changes in the domestic 
sovereign yield and the domestic money market interest rate (potentially capturing an 
immediate or expected response of the domestic central bank to the policy rate change in 
the US). In addition, I follow Pasquariello (2008) and include the change in the domestic 
CAPM β with respect to the US market, capturing potential (dis-)integration of the 
domestic economy from the US economy.59 Finally, I include the return of the US market 
and the change in the VIX as global control variables. If there were other reasons for 
                                                          
58 Following Gagnon and Karolyi (2010), ADR-specific idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from regressing the difference between U.S. dollar returns of the ADR and its 
underlying stock on contemporaneous and one day lagged and leading values of the US stock market, the 
respective domestic stock market and the change in the EUR/USD exchange rate using a rolling window 
of 30 trading days, see eq. (1) in Gagnon and Karolyi (2010). 
59 Computed as the daily change in the CAPM beta of the U.S. dollar returns of the local stock index of the 
respective country with respect to the US market, estimated using a rolling regressions framework of 30 
trading days. 
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deviations from the law of one price of ADRs around FOMC meetings beyond the ones 
that I control for, they would only affect my results if they significantly interacted with 
the exchange rate regime. 
Table A4.2 in the appendix of this chapter gives an overview over the variables 
and their sources and Table A4.3 provides descriptive statistics. Figure A4.1 in the 
appendix presents a histogram of US monetary surprises around FOMC meetings. Table 
4.2 summarizes the results from estimating equation (4.5). Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 report 
the corresponding marginal effects of 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 for each exchange rate 
regime separately. 
The interaction between 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 and 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡 and the resulting 
marginal effects of US monetary surprises for managed regimes are significantly negative 
at least at the 5% level throughout a variety of different specifications. Both results are 
robust to the inclusion of the additional control variables described above and to 
clustering standard errors by FOMC meeting instead of country. These results are in line 
with H1, suggesting a strong negative impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR 
returns for countries with managed exchange rates, whereas there is no significant impact 
for countries with freely floating exchange rates. Also for peg regimes, the effect of US 
monetary surprises is insignificant on average. However, I will study them more closely 
in the second part of my analysis.60 Positive (negative) US monetary surprises decrease 
(increase) the fundamental value of managed exchange rates below (above) the current 
spot exchange rate which does not fully reflect the new fundamental value due to the 
intervention of the domestic central bank. After controlling for other potential sources of 
deviations from the law of one price, these findings indicate that ADR returns reflect the 
                                                          
60 Also for the observations classified as “freely falling”, there is no significant impact of US monetary 
surprises when including the full set of control variables. In the remainder of this paper, results of this 
category, which only represent a small number of specific crisis episodes (1.71%), will not be discussed in 
detail. 
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risk that the actual spot exchange rate will converge to the fundamental value of the 
exchange rate if the domestic central bank ceases its intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. The relation for managed regimes is also economically significant, i.e. a one 
standard deviation increase in 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 decreases abnormal ADR returns by 
about 12.5 - 13.3 basis points (equivalent to 0.13 - 0.14 standard deviations). Table 4.5 
shows that for managed regimes, the economic significance of 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 
exceeds that of the other variables (expressed in standard deviations of abnormal ADR 
returns for one standard deviation of the respective variable) except for the return of the 
local market.
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Table 4.2: The impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional on the exchange rate 
regime 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Monetary surprise 0.287 0.090 0.279 0.295 0.295 
 (0.712) (0.654) (0.676) (0.693) (0.709) 
Managed regime 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Peg regime 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Freely falling regime 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Monetary surprise x managed regime -4.588** -4.670** -4.734** -4.781** -4.781*** 
 (1.920) (2.008) (1.975) (1.909) (1.484) 
Monetary surprise x peg regime -4.723 -2.516 -1.847 -1.634 -1.634 
 (2.893) (2.415) (2.305) (2.306) (1.963) 
Monetary surprise x freely falling regime 18.360*** 10.827* 10.070* 6.927 6.927 
 (4.242) (5.803) (5.496) (7.327) (5.602) 
Return US market  0.156** 0.137** 0.137** 0.137*** 
  (0.071) (0.065) (0.066) (0.041) 
Return local market  -0.119* -0.120* -0.117* -0.117*** 
  (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.020) 
∆ VIX   -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ CAPM beta    0.005 0.005 0.005* 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) 
∆ Sovereign yield   -0.554 -0.534 -0.534 
   (0.340) (0.322) (0.374) 
∆ Interest rate MM   0.001 -0.010 -0.010 
   (0.048) (0.053) (0.073) 
∆ Bid-ask ADR    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.003) (0.003) 
∆ Bid-ask UND    -0.061 -0.061 
    (0.061) (0.051) 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk    0.481 0.481 
    (0.377) (0.440) 
Constant -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 2,866 
No. of countries 31 31 31 31 31 
R² 0.20 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Country x Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES 
SEs clustered by  Country Country Country Country Meeting 
Notes: This table reports the panel estimation results of the regression model outlined in eq. (4.5):  𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽6𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽7𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1   + ∑ (𝛽9,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ (𝛽10,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ (𝛽11,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡)+𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡             
where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the mean of abnormal returns over all ADRs of the respective country for the respective FOMC 
meeting and 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 corresponds to the monetary surprise of the respective FOMC meeting (following Kuttner, 
2001). 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡, 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 are dummy variables describing the respective exchange rate regimes according to 
the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) classification as described in section 4.3.1. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1  represents a broad set of control variables, 𝜇𝑗,𝑎 a 
country x year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 the error term. Control variables include the returns of the US and the local market as well 
as first differences in VIX, the country-specific CAPM betas, sovereign yields, money market interest rates, bid-ask spreads of 
the ADR and its underlying as well as ADR-underlying pair specific idiosyncratic risk. Please note that for limitations with 
respect to space, this table only reports the unconditional effects as well as interactions with 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 . The 
coefficients of the interactions with the other control variables are available upon request. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level (spec. (1) to (4)) and clustered by FOMC meeting (spec. (5)) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.
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Table 4.5: The impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional on the exchange 
rate regime: Standardized marginal effects by exchange rate regime based on specification (5) 
Notes: This table reports standardized marginal effects by exchange rate regime based on specification (5) of the 
interaction model presented in Table 4.2. **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
4.3.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, I present a variety of tests to demonstrate the robustness of the results in 
the previous section. I begin by considering additional variables that might affect ADR 
pricing around FOMC meetings. I add four different variables as additional controls to 
equation (4.5). For each of these additional variables, I test for their unconditional effect 
on abnormal ADR returns as well as their interactions with 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the 
other control variables that were already included in equation (4.5). 
As described in section 4.2.3, I use last prices available prior to 3 p.m. UTC to 
calculate daily returns of ADRs, their underlying stocks as well as the spot exchange rates 
against the U.S. dollar. While for most of the countries in my sample (European and Latin 
American countries) domestic stock markets operate in regular mode at that time, most 
Asian markets are already closed. I include the dummy variable 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗  
(equal to one if the country’s stock market operates in regular mode at 3 p.m. UTC, zero 
otherwise) as the first additional variable into my model. 
Next, I ensure that results hold regardless of differences in capital account 
openness between the countries in my sample. Although Miniane and Rogers (2007) and 
Dedola et al. (2017) document that countries with restrictions on capital flows are not 
 (5) 
 Managed Peg Freely floating Freely falling 
Monetary surprise -0.132*** -0.034 0.005 0.313 
Return US market 0.106 0.273*** 0.100*** 0.213 
Return local market -0.325*** -0.232*** -0.204*** -0.487** 
∆ VIX 0.000 -0.156*** 0.000 0.231 
∆ CAPM beta -0.013 0.016 0.046* 0.013 
∆ Sovereign yield -0.052 -0.036 -0.088 0.037 
∆ Interest rate MM -0.002 -0.002 -0.01 0.014 
∆ Bid-ask ADR 0.000 0.086*** -0.059 0.015** 
∆ Bid-ask UND 0.075 -0.016 -0.043 0.050 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk 0.078* -0.030 0.034 -0.357 
Observations 2,866 
No. of countries 31 
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insulated from US monetary policy shocks, I will use two different concept to account for 
a potential impact of capital account openness on my results. First, I use the Chinn and 
Ito (2006) index of de jure capital account openness. Second, I follow Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2017) and use the sum of FDI and portfolio equity assets and liabilities relative 
to nominal GDP as a measure of de facto capital account openness. Low values of this 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) ratio indicate low capital account openness and low 
financial integration. In two separate specifications, I account for capital account 
openness by including these two additional variables as well as their interactions with 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the other control variables from equation (4.5). 
Third, I include log GDP per capita (in constant U.S. dollar) of the respective 
country as an additional variable to validate that my results are not affected by omitted 
macro variables such as the development status of the respective countries that might be 
correlated with the exchange rate regime. 
Finally, I test whether differences in the level of liquidity between currencies drive 
my results. Some managed emerging market currencies might be characterized by a 
relatively low level of liquidity. The significant negative impact of US monetary surprises 
on abnormal ADR returns for managed regimes might result from the fact that actual 
returns of the spot exchange rate do not yet incorporate the effect of the US monetary 
surprise due to their low trading activity. To account for the heterogeneity in the level of 
liquidity between the different currencies in my sample, I include the bid-ask-spread of 
the spot exchange rate of the respective currency against the U.S. dollar as an additional 
control variable. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 present the marginal effects of this interaction 
model, additionally controlling for synchronous trading, capital account openness (as 
identified by the Chinn and Ito, 2006, index in Table 4.6  and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2007, index in Table 4.7), real GDP per capita and liquidity in the spot exchange rate of 
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the respective currency. Again, the marginal effects of US monetary surprises on 
abnormal ADR returns for managed regimes remain significantly negative at least at the 
5% level. 
I continue by discussing the role of US unconventional monetary policy and its 
potential impact on my results. The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 and the 
unconventional monetary policy measures implemented by the FED in its aftermath affect 
a significant fraction of the sample of this paper. Several recent papers study the global 
transmission of US unconventional monetary policy (e.g., Bauer and Neely, 2014; 
Bowman et al., 2015; Neely, 2015; Anaya et al., 2017). 
One concern with the identification of the impact of US monetary policy on 
managed exchange rate regimes in this paper might be that the distribution of US 
monetary surprises during the zero lower bound (ZLB) period from December 2008 to 
December 2015 differs from the rest of the sample. In the empirical approach used for the 
analysis in this paper as described in equation (4.5), country x year fixed effects are 
included to control for the general conditions of the global economy as well as the state 
of the respective local economy. I thereby account for the possibility that financial crises 
(such as the Asian Crisis 1997/1998, the burst of the dotcom bubble 2000/2001 and the 
global financial crisis of 2007/2008) and other major macro events affect my results. 
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Table 4.6: The impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional on the exchange rate regime: Marginal 
effects of the robustness check controlling for synchronous trading, capital account openness following Chinn and Ito (2006), 
real GDP per capita and liquidity of the exchange rate 
 (1) (2) 
  Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Monetary surprise -4.472** -0.085 -0.299 16.277** -4.472*** -0.085 -0.299 16.277*** 
 (1.846) (1.526) (0.820) (7.108) (1.251) (2.279) (0.777) (6.090) 
Ret. US market 0.067 0.179** 0.126*** -0.025 0.067 0.179*** 0.126*** -0.025 
  (0.061) (0.074) (0.043) (0.486) (0.059) (0.065) (0.047) (0.182) 
Ret. local market -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.122*** -0.158 -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.122*** -0.158 
  (0.041) (0.050) (0.035) (0.100) (0.029) (0.036) (0.023) (0.101) 
∆ VIX -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
∆ CAPM beta  -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.028 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.028** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.020) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.013) 
∆ Sovereign yield -0.387 -0.137 0.025 2.176*** -0.387 -0.137 0.025 2.176*** 
  (0.537) (0.462) (0.449) (0.704) (0.350) (0.319) (0.494) (0.725) 
∆ Interest rate MM 0.004 -0.097 0.044 0.198 0.004 -0.097 0.044 0.198 
  (0.064) (0.087) (0.096) (0.168) (0.062) (0.085) (0.083) (0.127) 
∆ Bid-ask ADR 0.006*** 0.242 -0.001 0.012** 0.006*** 0.242 -0.001 0.012** 
  (0.001) (0.290) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.181) (0.003) (0.005) 
∆ Bid-ask UND 0.000 -0.050 -0.046 -0.010 0.000 -0.050 -0.046 -0.010 
  (0.082) (0.090) (0.039) (0.093) (0.082) (0.091) (0.063) (0.102) 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk 0.750 -0.138 0.474 -1.215 0.750 -0.138 0.474 -1.215 
  (0.569) (0.750) (0.514) (1.647) (0.602) (0.646) (0.475) (1.715) 
Observations 2,838 2,838 
No. of countries 31 31 
R² 0.36 0.36 
Country x  
Year FEs 
YES YES 
SEs clustered by  Country Meeting 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of a robustness check of the regression model outlined in eq. (4.5) where additional variables 
as well as their interactions with monetary surpriset and the control variables are included as described in section 4.3.2:  𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽6𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽7𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 + ∑ (𝛽9,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡)  
     + ∑ (𝛽10,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡)  + ∑ (𝛽11,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽12,𝑛𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽13,𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑁𝑛=1      
     + ∑ ∑ (𝛽14,𝑛,𝑙𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 )𝑁𝑛=1 +𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                    
These additional variables include a synchronous trading dummy (equal to one if the domestic stock market operates in regular mode at 3 
p.m. UTC, zero otherwise), capital account openness (as measured by the Chinn-Ito, 2006, index), log real GDP per capita and the bid-ask-
spread of the exchange rate. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level (spec. (1)) and clustered by FOMC meeting (spec. (2)) are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
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Table 4.7: The impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional on the exchange rate regime: Marginal 
effects of the robustness check controlling for synchronous trading, capital account openness following Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2017), real GDP per capita and liquidity of the exchange rate 
 (1) (2) 
  Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Monetary surprise -4.302*** 1.257 -0.935 14.458* -4.302*** 1.257 -0.935 14.458** 
 (1.489) (1.467) (0.778) (7.768) (1.285) (2.882) (0.786) (5.817) 
Ret. US market 0.076 0.125 0.170*** -0.199 0.076 0.125* 0.170*** -0.199 
  (0.062) (0.079) (0.047) (0.475) (0.056) (0.076) (0.054) (0.184) 
Ret. local market -0.137*** -0.086** -0.145*** -0.102 -0.137*** -0.086** -0.145*** -0.102 
  (0.038) (0.044) (0.038) (0.085) (0.029) (0.037) (0.025) (0.093) 
∆ VIX -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.003 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
∆ CAPM beta  -0.003 0.001 0.005 0.026 -0.003 0.001 0.005* 0.026** 
  (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.016) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) 
∆ Sovereign yield -0.293 -0.354 -0.321 4.569* -0.293 -0.354 -0.321 4.569*** 
  (0.562) (0.496) (0.434) (2.578) (0.344) (0.327) (0.501) (1.511) 
∆ Interest rate MM 0.066 -0.069 0.152* 0.464* 0.066 -0.069 0.152** 0.464*** 
  (0.074) (0.092) (0.086) (0.274) (0.080) (0.087) (0.076) (0.168) 
∆ Bid-ask ADR -0.028* 0.706** -0.061** -0.031 -0.028*** 0.706*** -0.061*** -0.031** 
  (0.017) (0.351) (0.031) (0.022) (0.010) (0.194) (0.018) (0.014) 
∆ Bid-ask UND 0.001 -0.042 -0.102** -0.257 0.001 -0.042 -0.102* -0.257** 
  (0.085) (0.082) (0.049) (0.179) (0.081) (0.099) (0.057) (0.115) 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk 0.821 -0.225 0.606 -2.270** 0.821 -0.225 0.606 -2.270 
  (0.592) (1.032) (0.422) (0.899) (0.604) (0.798) (0.544) (1.963) 
Observations 2,667 2,667 
No. of countries 31 31 
R² 0.38 0.38 
Country x  
Year FEs 
YES YES 
SEs clustered by  Country Meeting 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of a robustness check of the regression model outlined in eq. (4.5) where additional variables 
as well as their interactions with 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 and the control variables are included as described in section 4.3.2:  𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽6𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽7𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 + ∑ (𝛽9,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡)  
     + ∑ (𝛽10,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡)  + ∑ (𝛽11,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽12,𝑛𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽13,𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑁𝑛=1      
     + ∑ ∑ (𝛽14,𝑛,𝑙𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 )𝑁𝑛=1 +𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                    
These additional variables include a synchronous trading dummy (equal to one if the domestic stock market operates in regular mode at 3 
p.m. UTC, zero otherwise), capital account openness (as measured by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2017, index), log real GDP per capita and 
the bid-ask-spread of the exchange rate. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level (spec. (1)) and clustered by FOMC meeting 
(spec. (2)) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Gürkaynak et al. (2007) suggest using the first difference in the one-month 
Eurodollar deposit rate as an alternative to identify US monetary surprises. Using this 
measure, I also identify a significant negative impact of daily changes in the Eurodollar 
rate on abnormal ADR returns for managed exchange rate regimes, whereas there is no 
significant effect for freely floating exchange rates. Table 4.8 shows the marginal effects 
of the interaction model using changes in the Eurodollar rate. 
In addition, I ensure that the significant negative impact of US monetary surprises 
on abnormal ADR returns for countries with managed exchange rates also holds if all 
observations from the ZLB period are excluded. Table 4.9 displays the corresponding 
marginal effects of this interaction model. 
As additional robustness checks, I ensure that my results are not driven by outliers. 
First, I re-estimate specification (5) from equation (4.5), dropping single countries or 
meetings one at a time. Second, I exclude all observations below the 1st and above the 
99th percentiles of abnormal ADR returns. In all these cases, the results remain significant. 
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Table 4.8: The impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional on the exchange rate regime: Marginal 
effects of the robustness check using changes in the one-month Eurodollar deposit rate following Gürkaynak et al. (2007) 
 (1) (2) 
  Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
∆ Eurodollar -1.248** 0.394 -0.221 -1.911 -1.248** 0.394 -0.221 -1.911 
  (0.590) (1.886) (0.344) (4.252) (0.501) (0.996) (0.227) (5.563) 
Ret. US market 0.093 0.270** 0.142** 0.074 0.093* 0.270*** 0.142*** 0.074 
  (0.088) (0.122) (0.067) (0.170) (0.052) (0.075) (0.041) (0.172) 
Ret. local market -0.178*** -0.185* -0.120** -0.257** -0.178*** -0.185*** -0.120*** -0.257*** 
  (0.034) (0.108) (0.061) (0.100) (0.027) (0.043) (0.020) (0.098) 
∆ VIX -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
∆ CAPM beta  -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.004* -0.002 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.024) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.019) 
∆ Sovereign yield -0.424 -0.240 -0.442 0.647 -0.424 -0.240 -0.442 0.647 
  (0.370) (0.265) (0.284) (0.760) (0.305) (0.191) (0.379) (0.764) 
∆ Interest rate MM -0.003 -0.001 -0.021 0.053 -0.003 -0.001 -0.021 0.053 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.052) (0.101) (0.038) (0.024) (0.066) (0.113) 
∆ Bid-ask ADR -0.000 0.014*** -0.001 0.004*** -0.000 0.014*** -0.001 0.004*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
∆ Bid-ask UND 0.069 -0.027 -0.059 0.097** 0.069 -0.027 -0.059 0.097 
  (0.076) (0.072) (0.058) (0.043) (0.075) (0.070) (0.051) (0.092) 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk 0.968** -0.280 0.476 -3.597*** 0.968** -0.280 0.476 -3.597 
  (0.464) (0.679) (0.389) (0.900) (0.494) (0.413) (0.439) (2.618) 
Observations 2,825 2,825 
No. of countries 31 31 
R² 0.30 0.30 
Country x  
Year FEs 
YES YES 
SEs clustered by  Country Meeting 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of a robustness check of the regression model outlined in eq. (4.5) where instead of the US 
monetary surprise based on FED Funds Futures following Kuttner (2001), the ∆ in the one-month Eurodollar deposit rate (following 
Gürkaynak et al., 2007) is used:  𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽5∆𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽6∆𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽7∆𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 + ∑ (𝛽9,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡)  
     + ∑ (𝛽10,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡)  + ∑ (𝛽11,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽12,𝑛𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽13,𝑛∆𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡  𝑥 𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑁𝑛=1      
     + ∑ ∑ (𝛽14,𝑛,𝑙𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 )𝑁𝑛=1 +𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                    
where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the mean of abnormal returns over all ADRs of the respective country for the respective FOMC meeting  and ∆𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑡  corresponds to the monetary surprise of the respective FOMC meeting as identified by the ∆ in the one-month Eurodollar 
deposit rate (following Gürkaynak et al., 2007). 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡, 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 are dummy variables describing the respective exchange 
rate regimes according to the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) classification as described in section 4.3.1. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1  represents a broad set of control 
variables, 𝜇𝑗,𝑎 a country x year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  the error term. Control variables include the returns of the US and the local market as well 
as first differences in VIX, the country-specific CAPM betas, sovereign yields, money market interest rates, bid-ask spreads of the ADR and 
its underlying as well as ADR-underlying pair specific idiosyncratic risk. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level (spec. (1)) and 
clustered by FOMC meeting (spec. (2)) are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.9: The impact of US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns conditional on the exchange rate regime: Marginal 
effects of the robustness check without observations from the zero lower bound period (December 2008 – December 2015)  
 (1) (2) 
  Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Managed Peg 
Freely 
floating 
Freely 
falling 
Monetary surprise -5.553*** -1.358 0.013 5.828 -5.553*** -1.358 0.013 5.828 
 (2.005) (1.979) (0.782) (6.911) (1.436) (2.109) (0.669) (6.247) 
Ret. US market -0.124 0.218*** 0.181*** 0.137 -0.124* 0.218** 0.181*** 0.137 
  (0.113) (0.068) (0.055) (0.190) (0.073) (0.098) (0.046) (0.197) 
Ret. local market -0.172*** -0.205*** -0.138** -0.244*** -0.172*** -0.205*** -0.138*** -0.244** 
  (0.055) (0.071) (0.057) (0.083) (0.042) (0.050) (0.026) (0.103) 
∆ VIX -0.001* -0.001** 0.000 0.002 -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
∆ CAPM beta  -0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.009 -0.003 0.002 0.006* -0.009 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.023) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.021) 
∆ Sovereign yield -0.436 0.098 -0.781* 0.167 -0.436 0.098 -0.781 0.167 
  (0.542) (0.354) (0.432) (1.008) (0.427) (0.251) (0.531) (0.753) 
∆ Interest rate MM -0.009 0.002 -0.027 -0.018 -0.009 0.002 -0.027 -0.018 
  (0.057) (0.021) (0.033) (0.102) (0.043) (0.021) (0.070) (0.109) 
∆ Bid-ask ADR 0.000 0.012*** -0.001 0.004*** 0.000 0.012*** -0.001 0.004*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
∆ Bid-ask UND 0.036 -0.036 -0.091 0.081*** 0.036 -0.036 -0.091 0.081 
  (0.070) (0.077) (0.064) (0.031) (0.077) (0.080) (0.065) (0.086) 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk 0.782 0.032 0.516 -2.430*** 0.782 0.032 0.516 -2.430 
  (0.718) (0.900) (0.530) (0.757) (0.606) (0.492) (0.530) (2.737) 
Observations 1,700 1,700 
No. of countries 31 31 
R² 0.33 0.33 
Country x  
Year FEs 
YES YES 
SEs clustered by  Country Meeting 
Notes: This table reports the marginal effects of a robustness check of the regression model outlined in eq. (4.5) where all observations from 
the zero lower bound period (from December 2008 to December 2015) are excluded:  𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 = 𝛽1𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽5𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽6𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽7𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽8,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 + ∑ (𝛽9,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡)  
     + ∑ (𝛽10,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡)  + ∑ (𝛽11,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛽12,𝑛𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡𝑁𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛽13,𝑛𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  𝑥 𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑁𝑛=1      
     + ∑ ∑ (𝛽14,𝑛,𝑙𝑌𝑛,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 )𝑁𝑛=1 +𝜇𝑗,𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                    
where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the mean of abnormal returns over all ADRs of the respective country for the respective FOMC meeting and 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 corresponds to the monetary surprise of the respective FOMC meeting (following Kuttner, 2001). 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡, 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 
and 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡  are dummy variables describing the respective exchange rate regimes according to the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) classification as  
described in section 4.3.1. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1  represents a broad set of control variables, 𝜇𝑗,𝑎 a country x year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 the error term. Control 
variables include the returns of the US and the local market as well as first differences in VIX, the country-specific CAPM betas, sovereign 
yields, money market interest rates, bid-ask spreads of the ADR and its underlying as well as ADR-underlying pair specific idiosyncratic risk 
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level (spec. (1)) and clustered by FOMC meeting (spec. (2)) are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, and *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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4.4 US monetary policy and currency peg stability 
4.4.1 Results  
Positive US monetary surprises might lead to a higher expected probability that a currency 
peg regime to the U.S. dollar breaks down. As predicted by standard currency crises 
models of interest rate defence (e.g., Bensaid and Jeanne, 1997; Flood and Jeanne, 2005; 
Lahiri and Végh, 2007), domestic policy makers will opt to abandon a currency peg 
regime if the economic costs of mimicking a policy rate increase in the US outweigh the 
benefits of maintaining the peg regime. Increasing the domestic policy rate is costly if 
current real GDP growth is low, the country runs a fiscal deficit and the domestic banking 
system is in a weak state (Lahiri and Végh, 2007). 
The previous section documented a significant negative impact of US monetary 
surprises on abnormal ADR returns for managed exchange rate regimes. For peg regimes, 
the impact of US monetary surprises unconditional of the current state of the domestic 
economy was insignificant. Now, I focus on the effect of positive US monetary surprises 
on currency peg regimes, conditional on the current state of the domestic economy, to 
identify how investors assess the domestic government’s willingness to defend the 
currency peg regime by raising the domestic policy rate. As before, I use the continuous 
measure of US monetary surprises derived from Fed Funds Futures (following Kuttner, 
2001). However, I now distinguish between positive and negative US monetary surprises 
by defining the following two continuous variables:  
𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  = {𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡0  𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≥ 0  (4.6) 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡 = {  0𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡  
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑡 ≥ 0  (4.7) 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   
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According to H2, positive US monetary surprises might have a significant 
negative impact on abnormal ADR returns from countries with currencies pegged to the 
U.S. dollar if investors perceive that domestic policy makers will be reluctant to mimic 
unexpected US policy rate increases because they associate high economic costs with 
raising the domestic policy rate. There are two differences between the panel regression 
model that I estimate in this section and the one from the previous section: First, I now 
distinguish between positive and negative US monetary surprises. Second, I additionally 
interact with macro variables that proxy the three dimensions of costs associated with 
increasing the domestic policy rate suggested by Lahiri and Végh (2007): current real 
GDP growth, the fiscal balance and the current state of the domestic banking system: 
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𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡+𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 +𝛽5𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽6𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡+𝛽7𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽8𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽9𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽10𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽11𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽12𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽14𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽15𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽16𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽17𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽18𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽19𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽20𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽21𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽22𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽23𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽24,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1   
 + ∑ 𝛽25,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽26,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽27,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽28,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  + ∑ 𝛽29,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  + ∑ 𝛽30,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  + ∑ 𝛽31,𝑙𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛾𝑗 + 𝜇𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
(4.8) 
 where 𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 represents the average abnormal return of all ADRs from country 𝑗 
for FOMC meeting 𝑡 and 𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  (𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡) denotes positive (negative) continuous US 
monetary surprises as defined above. 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡, 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡  are the same 
dummy variables based on the Ilzetzki et al. (2019) monthly coarse de facto exchange 
rate regime classification as used in equation (4.5), 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑗,𝑡 is a continuous variable 
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proxying one of the three cost dimensions of raising the domestic policy rate following 
Lahiri and Végh (2007). At first, I will test each of the three cost dimensions (output costs, 
fiscal costs, deterioration of the domestic banking system) in a separate specification. In 
the next section, I will present a robustness check where I include all three macro 
variables simultaneously. ∑ 𝑋𝑙,𝑗,𝑡𝐿𝑙=1  represents the same set of control variables as used 
in equation (4.5), 𝛾𝑗  is a country fixed effect, 𝜇𝑎 a year fixed effect and 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 the error term. 
In the following, I test H2 by assessing the marginal effects of positive US 
monetary surprises on abnormal ADRs from countries with currencies pegged to the U.S. 
dollar over the 5th to 95th percentiles of the macro fundamental variable tested in the 
respective specification. Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.3 illustrate the marginal effects of positive 
and negative US monetary surprises and their 90% confidence intervals. Diagrams in the 
left column display confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the country 
level, whereas diagrams in the right column display confidence intervals based on 
standard errors clustered by FOMC meeting. Table A4.4 in the appendix of this chapter 
provides descriptive statistics over the respective macro fundamentals for the countries 
with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar in my sample.  
Lahiri and Végh (2007) name output cost as one of three cost dimensions 
associated with raising the domestic policy rate to defend a currency peg. Increasing the 
domestic policy rate leads to a credit crunch and to an output contraction. Therefore, 
policy makers from countries that experience relatively low real GDP growth might be 
reluctant to increase the domestic policy rate since this would further deter economic 
growth. To account for country-specific growth dynamics, I define relative GDP growth 
as current real GDP growth minus average real GDP growth in the respective country 
over the past ten years. Figure 4.1 illustrates the marginal effects and 90% confidence 
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intervals of positive US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns of countries with 
currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar over the 5th to 95th percentile of relative GDP growth. 
Figure 4.1: Marginal effects of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. dollar over the 
5th to 95th percentiles of relative GDP growth 
  
Notes: Marginal effects and 90% confidence intervals of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. 
dollar over the 5th to 95th percentiles of relative GDP growth obtained by estimating the panel regression model outlined 
in eq. (4.6) robust standard errors clustered at the country level (left diagram) or by FOMC meeting (right diagram). 
GDP growth is defined as the respective country’s current real GDP growth minus the country’s average real GDP 
growth over the past ten years.  
If relative GDP growth is equal to or below zero, i.e. current real GDP growth is 
equal or lower compared to the country’s average over the past ten years, positive US 
monetary surprises significantly reduce abnormal ADR returns from countries with 
currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar as hypothesized by H2. Effects are stronger (i.e. the 
impact is more negative), the lower current relative to past real GDP growth. These results 
indicate that investors will perceive domestic policy makers to be reluctant to mimic 
unexpected US policy rate increases if current economic growth is relatively low. Since 
raising the domestic policy rate would further deter economic growth, negative abnormal 
ADR returns reflect an increase in the expected peg breakdown probability for these 
countries.    
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Results are also economically significant. For a country that currently experiences 
a strong recession, i.e. where current real GDP growth is 8% below average real GDP 
growth over the past ten years, a one standard deviation increase in positive US monetary 
surprises reduces abnormal ADR returns by 0.36% (about 0.35 standard deviations). On 
the other hand, if current real GDP growth exceeds past growth, there are no significant 
effects of US monetary surprises. Thus, investors do not perceive domestic policy makers 
to be reluctant to mimic US policy rate increases if current real GDP growth is relatively 
high. 
Fiscal cost represent the second cost dimension associated with increasing the 
domestic policy rate to defend a currency peg suggested by Lahiri and Végh (2007). If 
the government currently runs a fiscal deficit, raising the domestic policy rate will be 
costly since it will increase the government’s borrowing cost and thus further deteriorate 
its financial situation (e.g. Lahiri and Végh, 2003; Flood and Jeanne, 2005; Lahiri and 
Végh, 2007). I proxy fiscal cost by the fiscal balance relative to GDP. Consequently, 
positive US monetary surprises should have a significant negative impact on abnormal 
ADR returns of countries with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar if these countries run 
fiscal deficits. Figure 4.2 illustrates the marginal effects of positive US monetary surprises 
on abnormal ADR returns of countries with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar over the 
5th to 95th percentile of the fiscal balance relative to GDP. 
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Figure 4.2: Marginal effects of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. dollar over the 
5th to 95th percentiles of the fiscal balance 
   
Notes: Marginal effects and 90% confidence intervals of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. 
dollar over the 5th to 95th percentiles of the fiscal balance obtained by estimating the panel regression model outlined 
eq. (4.6) using robust standard errors clustered at the country level (left diagram) or by FOMC meeting (right diagram). 
Results of this second interaction model are also in line with H2. Unanticipated 
increases in the US policy rate significantly reduce abnormal ADR returns from countries 
with governments that currently run fiscal deficits equal to or larger than 4% (2%) of 
GDP.61,62 For countries that manage to generate fiscal surpluses or that face only minor 
deficits there are no significant effects.  
Finally, I study the impact of US monetary surprises on the stability of currency 
peg regimes to the U.S. dollar, conditional on the soundness of the domestic banking 
system. Policy makers take the health of the domestic banking system into consideration 
when deciding on policy rate changes (e.g., Eichler et al., 2018). Raising the domestic 
policy rate will be costly if it induces a further deterioration of an already weak banking 
system (Lahiri and Végh, 2007). Therefore, domestic policy makers will be reluctant to 
                                                          
61 In this case, the exact threshold depends on the clustering of standard errors. 
62 First-generation currency crises models provide an alternative explanation for this finding. According to 
these models, the fiscal balance serves as a proxy for the overall stability of the peg regime. Persistent 
deficits of the domestic government are inconsistent with a peg regime if the domestic central bank 
refinances the fiscal deficit. 
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increase the domestic policy rate if the current state of the domestic banking system is 
already fragile. I proxy banking sector stability by the return of the respective country’s 
banking index since the previous FOMC meeting. Figure 4.3 illustrates the results of this 
interaction model. 
Figure 4.3: Marginal effects of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. dollar over the 
5th to 95th percentiles of the return of the domestic banking index since the previous FOMC meeting 
  
Notes: Marginal effects and 90% confidence intervals of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. 
dollar over the 5th to 95th percentiles of the return of the domestic banking index since the previous FOMC meeting 
obtained by estimating the panel regression model outlined in eq. (4.6) robust standard errors clustered at the country 
level (left diagram) or by FOMC meeting (right diagram). 
The more fragile the current state of the domestic banking sector (i.e. the lower 
the domestic banking index’s returns since the previous FOMC meeting), the more 
negative the impact of positive US monetary surprises on abnormal ADR returns for peg 
regimes. This result indicates that investors will perceive domestic policy makers to be 
reluctant to mimic US policy rate increases if the domestic banking system already is in 
a weak state. On the other hand, investors do not anticipate domestic policy makers to be 
reluctant to raise the domestic policy rate if the domestic banking system is in a sound 
state (characterized by relatively high returns of the domestic banking index).  
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4.4.2 Robustness checks 
In this section, I present a couple of checks to demonstrate the robustness of the results 
regarding the impact of US monetary policy on the stability of currency pegs. I start by 
using capital adequacy, defined as the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, as an 
alternative concept to proxy the soundness of the domestic banking system. Figure 4.4 
illustrates the marginal effects of US monetary surprises of an alternative interaction 
model where I include the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets instead of the return of 
the domestic banking index since the previous FOMC meeting. 
Figure 4.4: Marginal effects of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. dollar over the 
5th to 95th percentiles of capital to risk-weighted assets in the domestic banking sector 
  
Notes: Marginal effects and 90% confidence intervals of positive US monetary surprises for peg regimes to the U.S. 
dollar over the 5th to 95th percentiles of capital to risk-weighted assets in the domestic banking sector obtained by 
estimating the panel regression model outlined in eq. (4.6) using robust standard errors clustered at the country level 
(left diagram) or by FOMC meeting (right diagram). 
The results regarding the impact of US monetary surprises on currency peg 
stability conditional on the soundness of the domestic banking system are robust to using 
this alternative measure. The impact of positive US monetary surprises is stronger for 
countries with a weaker current state of their domestic banking system (characterized by 
a lower capital adequacy ratio). Effects are insignificant for countries with a well-
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capitalized banking system (with a ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets equal to or 
above 15.8%). 
As additional robustness check, I include binary variables to distinguish high costs of 
raising the domestic policy rate (countries with below-average real GDP growth, fiscal 
deficits and negative returns of the domestic banking index since the last FOMC meeting) 
instead of the continuous variables used so far. For each of the three cost dimensions, I 
construct a dummy variable equal to one if the respective variable is above zero, zero 
otherwise. Table 4.10 summarizes the marginal effects of US monetary surprises and the 
additional control variables for currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar for high vs. low costs 
of raising the domestic policy rate for the three dimensions of costs suggested by Lahiri 
and Végh (2007).  
The results from this interaction model using binary macro variables are in line 
with the results of the interaction model using continuous macro variables presented 
above. Positive US monetary surprises significantly reduce abnormal ADR returns if 
relative GDP growth is negative, i.e. current real GDP growth is below the country’s 
average over the past ten years, the country runs a fiscal deficit and the return of the 
domestic banking index since the previous FOMC meeting is negative. At the same time, 
there is no significant impact of positive US monetary surprises if investors perceive low 
costs of mimicking the US policy rate increases (if the three macro variables are positive). 
Table A4.5 in the appendix of this chapter shows that these results also hold using 
standard errors clustered by FOMC meeting instead of at the country level. 
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 For these binary interaction models, I also ensure that the results are robust to 
accounting for differences in capital openness. Similar to the robustness checks presented 
in section 4.3.2, I use the Chinn and Ito (2006) index of de jure capital account openness 
and the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) index of de facto capital account openness. In 
three different specifications, I drop observations with a score of zero in the Chinn-Ito 
(2006) index of de jure capital account openness63 (Table A4.6 in the appendix of this 
chapter), additionally control for the Chinn-Ito (2006) index (Table A4.7 in the appendix) 
and additionally control for the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) index (Table A4.8 in the 
appendix). In all three cases, the results remain robust. 
Finally, I use the following alternative specification where I include all three 
binary macro variables (relative GDP growth, the fiscal balance and the return of the 
domestic banking index) simultaneously: 
 
                                                          
63 This affects Chile between 1996 – 1998 and Argentina 2012 – 2015. 
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𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡𝐴𝐷𝑅 =  𝛽1𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽4𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽5𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽6𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡+𝛽7𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽8𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽9𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽10𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽11𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡  + ∑ (𝛽12,𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡3𝑙=1 +𝛽13,𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡 𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽14,𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡+𝛽15,𝑙𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽16,𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽17,𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽18,𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽19,𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑠 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡   +𝛽20,𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽21,𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽22,𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑝𝑒𝑔𝑗,𝑡  +𝛽23,𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑔 𝑀𝑆𝑡  𝑥 𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑙,𝑗,𝑡  𝑥 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗,𝑡)  +𝛾𝑗+𝜇𝑎 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
(4.9) 
 Table A4.9 (standard errors clustered at the country level) and Table A4.10 
(standard errors clustered by FOMC meeting) in the appendix of this chapter show that 
the results presented in the previous section are also robust to the inclusion all three 
dimensions of costs associated with increasing the domestic policy rate as suggested by 
Lahiri and Végh (2007) at the same time.  
4.5 Conclusion 
I study the impact of US monetary policy on managed exchange rates by analyzing the 
pricing of American Depositary Receipts around FOMC meetings. For a sample of 249 
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level II and level III ADRs from 31 countries over the period from 1996 to 2016 (covering 
168 FOMC meetings), I identify a significant negative impact of US monetary surprises 
on abnormal ADR returns for countries with managed exchange rates. My findings 
indicate changes in the fundamental value of managed currencies caused by US monetary 
surprises.  
I further test the predictions of standard currency crises models of interest rate 
defence with respect to the stability of currency pegs vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. In line with 
Lahiri and Végh (2007), I identify a significant negative impact of US monetary surprises 
on abnormal returns of ADRs from countries with currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar if 
current real GDP growth is below past growth, the country faces a fiscal deficit and the 
domestic banking index has lost in value since the previous FOMC meeting. These results 
demonstrate that investors perceive a low willingness of domestic policy makers to 
defend these currency pegs due to high costs associated with increasing the domestic 
policy rate. Investors therefore expect a higher peg breakdown probability, which is 
reflected in negative abnormal ADR returns. Analyzing abnormal ADR returns around 
FOMC meetings thus provides a valuable tool to policy makers eager to monitor how 
investors assess the fundamental value of currencies as well as currency peg stability, the 
costs of defending the peg and the risk of speculative attacks.
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Table A4.3: Descriptive statistics over all countries and FOMC meetings 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 5% 95% 𝐴𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑅 -0.08% 1.03% -1.83% 1.51% 
Monetary surprise -0.00pp 0.03pp -0.05pp 0.04pp 
Managed regime 0.32 0.46 0 1 
Peg regime 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Freely falling regime 0.02 0.13 0 0 
Return US market 0.04% 1.32% -2.31% 2.11% 
Return local market 0.15% 1.82% -2.69% 2.80% 
∆ VIX -0.35 2.00 -3.16 3.05 
∆ CAPM beta -0.01 0.12 -0.17 0.13 
∆ Sovereign yield -0.01pp 0.13pp -0.13pp 0.11pp 
∆ Interest rate MM -0.02pp 0.81pp -0.22pp 0.17pp 
∆ Bid-ask ADR 0.43pp 20.28pp -0.47pp 0.51pp 
∆ Bid-ask UND -0.01pp 0.79pp -0.58pp 0.61pp 
∆ Idiosyncratic risk 0.00pp 0.11pp -0.12pp 0.14pp 
Synchronous trading  0.59 0.49 0 1 
Ka open 0.69 0.33 0.17 1 
LMF open 154.19% 592.27% 17.14% 586.79% 
Log real GDP per capita 9.67 1.19 7.41 11.24 
Bid-ask exchange rate 0.11% 0.21% 0.01% 0.37% 
∆ Eurodollar -0.00pp 0.07pp -0.06pp 0.05pp 
 
Figure A4.1: Histogram of US monetary surprises by FOMC meeting 
 
 
Table A4.4: Descriptive statistics for regimes pegged to the U.S. dollar 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 5% 95% 
Pos. MS 0.01pp 0.02pp 0.00pp 0.05pp 
Neg. MS -0.01pp 0.03pp -0.06pp 0.00pp 
Rel. GDP growth 0.13% 3.96% -7.57% 7.54% 
Fiscal balance -1.86% 3.96% -9.06% 4.14% 
Return bank  1.26% 11.99% -16.49% 21.69% 
Capital to RWA 15.65% 2.21% 12.32% 19.16% 
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